Harter Determinismus und Spiritualität

Die Autoren Robert Cunningham und Alexander Fürstenberg wollen anmerken, dass die Diskussion in Form eines Email-Austausches stattfand und nicht zur Veröffentlichung vorgesehen war.

From Alexander Fürstenberg, 6/13/03:
Dear Rob,

it's now been a while since we conversed last. As I can see, it's over one
year ago. I just wanted to hear how you are and how well your course is
going. And I wanted to apologize that I couldn't do anything I planned in
regard to it such a long time. I had some serious health problems which
prevented me from doing anything meaningful the last year. Please write me
something about you and the course. I'm eager to hear from you again.

Alexander
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Robert Cunningham, 6/13/03:
Dear Alexander,

Last time I tried to send you an e-note (over a year ago), I received an error message
indicating that my note was rejected by your server.  I hope this one will reach
you successfully.  In any case, I was concerned about you, and I'm happy to hear
from you again.  I made a few minor changes to the course last fall, in response
to feedback from other users of it.  Basically, the changes clarified some of my
definitions and explanations.  But most of my time and energies in the last year
have been devoted to other things--such as my hobby of triathlon.  (I did a half-Ironman
recently, and training for that took LOTS of time.)

I'm sorry to hear about your health problems.  I also remember that you seemed rather
worried about your financial situation when we last corresponded, or at least that's
what I inferred from what you said.  I hope you'll let me know more of what's going
on in your life.

Your friend,

Rob
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Alexander, 6/13/03:
> Dear Alexander,
>
> Last time I tried to send you an e-note (over a year ago), I
> received an error message indicating that my note was rejected by
> your server.  I hope this one will reach you successfully.  In
> any case, I was concerned about you, and I'm happy to hear from
> you again.  I made a few minor changes to the course last fall,
> in response to feedback from other users of it.  Basically, the
> changes clarified some of my definitions and explanations.  But
> most of my time and energies in the last year have been devoted
> to other things--such as my hobby of triathlon.  (I did a
> half-Ironman recently, and training for that took LOTS of time.)
>
> I'm sorry to hear about your health problems.  I also remember
> that you seemed rather worried about your financial situation
> when we last corresponded, or at least that's what I inferred
> from what you said.  I hope you'll let me know more of what's
> going on in your life.
>
> Your friend,
>
> Rob

Great to hear from you again! As I once said, I admire anone who can do a
triathlon -- full or half. It surely requires a lot of self-discipline and
stamina. Really great. I envy you. I can be happy when I don't get out of
breath taking the stairs up to my appartment. What's going on in my life?

Well, I had a nervous breakdown last year, around the time we had our phone
call. In retrospective, it was quit frightening. And it's still not over
completely. I'm sad that I have to report that I have to use medications to
keep it in check. I got uncertain of what is true and what is not. This
extends to my philosophical convicions, being much more mellow now then I
was. I'm searching. I thought one day that I found what I was looking for,
but now I see that I'm still searching for meaning. And yes, financially I'm
still broke.

How much visitors do you get on your site? I'm still curious determining the
financial value of the undertaking. Do you think your work paid? Do you plan
to visit anytime soon Germany?

Alexander
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Rob, 6/13/03:
> I can be happy when I don't get out of breath taking the stairs up to my appartment.
What's going on in my life?

A:  It's just a matter of physical conditioning.  Omitting a lot of details gathered
from experiments by sports scientists, the basic pattern is:

   overload-->recovery-->adaptation.

That is, a person who wishes to improve his physical condition begins by undertaking
a stress slightly beyond his usual exertions.  For instance, he may walk up 5 flights
of stairs, even though he customarily only goes up 4 flights.  He then allows his
body a couple of days to recover, during which the heart, lungs, and other systems
adapt to accommodate the increased demand, becoming stronger than previously.  After
that, he should find it somewhat easier to walk up the 5 flights of stairs again.
The following week, he might increase his exertion to 6 flights.  This principle
works not only for athletes, but for practically anyone, even people who've suffered
heart attacks in the past (although they should consult with their doctors first).

Triathlon training follows the same principle, except that swimming, bicycling,
and running are a lot more fun than going up and down stairs all day!  Also, having
specific races in mind provides great mental motivation for training, and the races
are a great social outlet.

> I got uncertain of what is true and what is not. This extends to my philosophical
convicions, being much more mellow now then I was. I'm searching.

A:  Yes, you seemed driven, almost frantic, before.  A little mellowness is probably
desirable.  That doesn't mean abandoning the truths or values of Objectivism.  While
my philosophical outlook is rooted in Objectivism, it is also combined with a Weltanschauung
that is both optimistic and realistic.  I don't look upon every negative setback
as if it were the end of the world--that's the "all-or-nothing" fallacy,
which I once mentioned to you as an example of a cognitive distortion.  Also, I'm
very aware of the positive potential in human nature.  In fact, I think that awareness
of this potential is implicit in Objectivism, which recognizes that people can choose
to think, and that those who choose not to think sabotage themselves, so that their
ability to sway our culture in a negative direction is limited in the long run.
Although it sounds romantic and even corny, I really believe that truth and justice
prevail in the end--and that makes it easier for me to preserve my equanimity when
things go less well than usual.

> How much visitors do you get on your site? I'm still curious determining the
financial value of the undertaking. Do you think your work paid?

A:  I haven't really bothered to try to track the number of visitors to the various
pages in the site.  As I think I've told you before, I've always regarded the Human
Action Course more as an avocation than as a money-making venture.  That's just
my personal preference, based on my own needs and circumstances.  If you see it
differently, that's fine too.

I forgot to mention in my last note that I've put another copy of the course at
another URL, www.HumanActionCourse.info (also www.HumanActionCourse.com).  This
URL is obviously more appropriate and easier for users to remember than the clumsy
old address (www.mindspring.com/~cunningr).  I intend to keep it available at both
addresses.

> Do you plan to visit anytime soon Germany?

A:  Unfortunately, I don't do a lot of traveling...although (who knows?) maybe someday
I'll want to do Ironman Germany.  For now, I find it enjoyable just to be able to
correspond with someone abroad, such as yourself.

Rob
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Alexander, 6/14/03:
> A:  It's just a matter of physical conditioning.  Omitting a lot
> of details gathered from experiments by sports scientists, the
> basic pattern is:
>
>    overload-->recovery-->adaptation.
>
> That is, a person who wishes to improve his physical condition
> begins by undertaking a stress slightly beyond his usual
> exertions.  For instance, he may walk up 5 flights of stairs,
> even though he customarily only goes up 4 flights.  He then
> allows his body a couple of days to recover, during which the
> heart, lungs, and other systems adapt to accommodate the
> increased demand, becoming stronger than previously.  After that,
> he should find it somewhat easier to walk up the 5 flights of
> stairs again.  The following week, he might increase his exertion
> to 6 flights.  This principle works not only for athletes, but
> for practically anyone, even people who've suffered heart attacks
> in the past (although they should consult with their doctors first).
>
> Triathlon training follows the same principle, except that
> swimming, bicycling, and running are a lot more fun than going up
> and down stairs all day!  Also, having specific races in mind
> provides great mental motivation for training, and the races are
> a great social outlet.

That makes sense. One could use these principles from sports even as
metaphor for psychological growth. Perhaps times of overload or crisis, even
if this is hard to accept, are crucial for a better adaptation to ones
social environment. If this is true, I'm more reasonable now then I was one
year ago.


> A:  Yes, you seemed driven, almost frantic, before.  A little
> mellowness is probably desirable.  That doesn't mean abandoning
> the truths or values of Objectivism.  While my philosophical
> outlook is rooted in Objectivism, it is also combined with a
> Weltanschauung that is both optimistic and realistic.  I don't
> look upon every negative setback as if it were the end of the
> world--that's the "all-or-nothing" fallacy, which I once
> mentioned to you as an example of a cognitive distortion.  Also,
> I'm very aware of the positive potential in human nature.  In
> fact, I think that awareness of this potential is implicit in
> Objectivism, which recognizes that people can choose to think,
> and that those who choose not to think sabotage themselves, so
> that their ability to sway our culture in a negative direction is
> limited in the long run.  Although it sounds romantic and even
> corny, I really believe that truth and justice prevail in the
> end--and that makes it easier for me to preserve my equanimity
> when things go less well than usual.

Equanimity is exactly what I have to learn. Yes, I was indeed driven, but I
didn't know it showed in my writing. Sometimes it felt ?good? to be
aggressive. My doctor said it was a sign of hypomania. The other side of
this extreme confidence was frequently a state of panic and despair. Now I?m
taking medication against it. The side effect is that I lost certainty in my
political convictions and even interest in politics at all. I?m still
Objectivist/Aristotelian, as you are, but I see that this is not enough for
me to heal. I?m now fully aware that the need for spirituality arises from
psychological crises. And that?s the missing element in Objectivism and
science as world view. The problem is that truth and spirituality are not
compatible. I think this even extends to our concept of morality. Perhaps
the religionists are right that being consistently moral is rooted in faith.
What implications does this have for a society in which respect for reason
is upheld as important value?


> A:  I haven't really bothered to try to track the number of
> visitors to the various pages in the site.  As I think I've told
> you before, I've always regarded the Human Action Course more as
> an avocation than as a money-making venture.  That's just my
> personal preference, based on my own needs and circumstances.  If
> you see it differently, that's fine too.
>
> I forgot to mention in my last note that I've put another copy of
> the course at another URL, www.HumanActionCourse.info (also
> www.HumanActionCourse.com).  This URL is obviously more
> appropriate and easier for users to remember than the clumsy old
> address (www.mindspring.com/~cunningr).  I intend to keep it
> available at both addresses.

I changed already the links on Objektivismus.de.

Alexander
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Rob, 6/19/03:
> The side effect is that I lost certainty in my political convictions and even
interest in politics at all. I'm still Objectivist/Aristotelian, as you are, but
I see that this is not enough for me to heal. I'm now fully aware that the need
for spirituality arises from psychological crises. And that's the missing element
in Objectivism and science as world view. The problem is that truth and spirituality
are not compatible. I think this even extends to our concept of morality. Perhaps
the religionists are right that being consistently moral is rooted in faith.

A:  I think that the most enlightened Objectivists would agree that spirituality
is a legitimate need, which has not yet been fully addressed by Objectivism.  The
whole issue was discussed at length not long ago in one of the Objectivist Center's
conferences.  I you haven't seen it already, I think you might find this summary
of interest:  http://objectivistcenter.org/articles/reclaiming-spirituality-from-religion.asp

As I see it, spirituality must consist of something more than simply holding the
correct philosophical tenets.  That doesn't mean that there's any kind of incompatibility
between truth and spirituality.  It merely means that abstract knowledge isn't enough.
We also need some kind of deep inner emotional conviction that we can understand
this world, function well in it, and achieve happiness in it--and moreover that
we SHOULD understand it and function well in it, and that we deserve happiness in
it.  A beginning point for this conviction is the certainty that our reason can
grasp reality.  Notice that "faith" doesn't support this conviction, and
is in fact incompatible with it:  faith implies that our reason isn't good enough,
that we must make some leap beyond the rationally justifiable.

The key question, of course, is where we can get this kind of spiritual conviction.
As I indicated, abstract philosophy isn't enough in itself (although it certainly
helps to start with the right philosophical premises).  I think that the arts and
literature play key roles here.  In my work as a composer in years past, I was keenly
aware of the spiritual meaning of my music, seeking to convey to the listener a
deep emotional sense of the joyful possibilities of existence.  In addition, social
bonds can play provide the individual with spiritual nourishment on a day-to-day
basis, if he seeks out and associates with people who have a positive outlook on
life and with whom he can share his goals and values.

Our spiritual needs, by the way, are not limited to times of psychological crises,
even though the latter may bring those needs to the fore.  The inner conviction
described above motivates us constantly, through good times and bad, enabling us
to bring positive energy to all our endeavors.  I should also mention that I have
occasionally suffered through periods of profound discouragement myself, during
which it was only that essential conviction that kept me going.

Rob
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Alexander, 6/21/03:
Thank you for your thoughtful response. One sees that your answer is well
thought out and one senses that it experience speaks through you. After
reading it I think that it can be structured according three main points: 1.
How can certainty be achieved? 2. How can spiritual needs be met? And 3. Is
faith as spiritual practice acceptable?

1. In the conference summary you referred me to, Ken Livingston is reported
to have told that existential certainty is crucial to life satisfaction and
happiness for people of moderate or low education. The question is How can
it be achieved? As we can read the subject of ones certainty must not be
religious but can also be the ethical principles of a secular philosophy. I
think the best preconditions for certainty are the philosophy's
intelligibility, i.e. her logical consistence and economy. While Objectivism
is pretty good at these points its clash with facts give rise to serious
doubts whether the principles identified are not only logical but also true.
I certainly have problems with some points in Objectivism and I don't know
how to overcome them. The necessary philosophical and existential certainty
in my life is currently missing - badly.

2. I mentioned that I think truth and spirituality are incompatible. At
least that is true for traditional forms of spirituality. I don't agree that
all one has to do to experience spirituality is the consumption of art and
literature. Sure, the concretization of ones philosophical beliefs is
important, but the beliefs themselves are important too. It seems that
rational convictions (i.e. those compatible with the sciences) are
inherently anti-spiritual, and that is a problem for me in this phase of my
life. It wasn't a problem until recently, but now it is. Branden criticizes
in The Art of Living Consciously the following elements traditionally
associated with spirituality: belief in God; self-transcendence; mysticism;
selflessness. But these elements seem to be crucial to spirituality. The
mere consumption of uplifting art doesn't seem to be enough. At least it is
not for me. I for example, while I simply cannot believe in supernatural
beings, had in my phases of greatest anxiety and despair the urgent need to
"pray to God". It is somewhat embarrassing for me to admit that, but it
is
nonetheless the fact. So what should I do now with this newly discovered
need? Should I fight it as form of irrationality or should I give up the
fight and try to see it as merely psychological relief mechanism? Do we need
something that is bigger then we are? I think so. At least for some sort of
people. Where I agree with you is that a spiritual life can best be
practiced in a closely knit community where fundamental philosophical values
are shared. The problem is finding those people.

3. A life based solely on rationality would be the one of a "prudent
predator" (I'm sure you heard the term in philosophical discussions), always
calculating the cost-benefit-ratio of being moral versus immoral. This life
is for the majority of people neither practicable nor rewarding. (I couldn't
do it.) To think that way - cynically calculating - is simply to demanding
and emotionally devastating. For psychological health, it is much better to
have faith in the morality of others and the positive outcome of one's own
consistent practice of morality, isn't it? Furthermore, I suspect, that a
society based on a truly objective code of ethics would be closer to fascism
then to democracy. (But I'm not sure about that.) So some elements of faith
are probably rational in the context of one's overall psychological
well-being. What do you think? Am I right?

Alexander
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Rob, 6/25/03:
> In the conference summary you referred me to, Ken Livingston is reported to
have told that existential certainty is crucial to life satisfaction and happiness
for people of moderate or low education. The question is How can it be achieved?
As we can read the subject of ones certainty must not be religious but can also
be the ethical principles of a secular philosophy.  I think the best preconditions
for certainty are the philosophy's intelligibility, i.e. her logical consistence
and economy. While Objectivism is pretty good at these points its clash with facts
give rise to serious doubts whether the principles identified are not only logical
but also true.  I certainly have problems with some points in Objectivism and I
don't know how to overcome them. The necessary philosophical and existential certainty
in my life is currently missing - badly.

A:  As I interpret Objectivism, its central principle is adherence to objective
reality--that is, "facts" always come first, so there can by definition
be no "clash with facts."  Of course, it's quite possible that some specific
statements of Ayn Rand may have clashed with reality, and indeed I think a few of
them did.  But as I view it, a true Objectivist should go with the facts in such
cases, and not with any "received doctrine."  My view, of course, might
not make some ARI people very happy.

Also, I think it is necessary to distinguish between (1) epistemological certainty
in the philosophical sense and (2) psychological self-confidence.  It is quite possible
for one to have a valid basis for logical or epistemological certainty regarding
an issue, yet at the same time to harbor some internal qualms about it.  Human psychology,
after all, is very complex, and the logical connections we make through our consciousness
are not always immediately and fully integrated down to the core of our being.

> I mentioned that I think truth and spirituality are incompatible. At least
that is true for traditional forms of spirituality.

A:  Yes, but obviously when Objectivists talk about spirituality they cannot mean
it in the traditional sense, since traditionally spirituality is entirely identified
with religion.  Fortunately, I was not brought up in a religious tradition, so I
find it easier to think about matters of spirit without the religious baggage.

> I don't agree that all one has to do to experience spirituality is the consumption
of art and literature. Sure, the concretization of ones philosophical beliefs is
important, but the beliefs themselves are important too.

A:  I agree.  The beliefs are important, and their concretization through art, literature,
and other means is important as well.  I think there is plenty of room for more
creative thinking among Objectivists about how we can fulfill our spiritual needs.

> It seems that rational convictions (i.e. those compatible with the sciences)
are inherently anti-spiritual, and that is a problem for me in this phase of my
life.

A:  I'm not sure how you reach this conclusion.  Again, if the term "spirituality"
is understood in a broader sense, and not merely as a synonym for "religion,"
then I don't see any clash between rational conviction and spirituality.  That's
not to say, of course, that rational conviction alone is enough to fulfill our spiritual
needs.  But I do believe it is the right starting point.

> I for example, while I simply cannot believe in supernatural beings, had in
my phases of greatest anxiety and despair the urgent need to "pray to God".
It is somewhat embarrassing for me to admit that, but it is nonetheless the fact.
So what should I do now with this newly discovered need? Should I fight it as form
of irrationality or should I give up the fight and try to see it as merely psychological
relief mechanism? Do we need something that is bigger then we are? I think so.

A:  In my moments of most profound discouragement, I have felt something similar
to this--a profound wish that there existed some higher force that could help me
through my problems.  In retrospect, though, it really was a wish rather than a
need, for I was eventually able to pull myself out of my depression, with some assistance
from other people (and not other-worldly sources).  If I use the definition from
my course, a "need" as "a thing that is required to maintain or enhance
the life of an organism."  And without a doubt I have been able, not merely
to maintain my life, but to enhance it greatly, without the benefit of some "higher"
intervention.

One thing that I find helpful is to learn to trust in the power of my subconscious.
As I point out in the course, the subconscious is in the long run programmed by
the ideas and values generated by the conscious mind.  Consequently, if one consciously
embraces positive and life-affirming premises, then in the long run the subconscious
part of one's mind will also assist in guiding one's life in a positive direction.
Furthermore, precisely because it is not part of consciousness, the subconscious
is perceived as a kind of "other," and therefore can provide the kind
of "outside" assistance for which we sometimes experience a deep emotional
craving.

> A life based solely on rationality would be the one of a "prudent predator"
(I'm sure you heard the term in philosophical discussions), always calculating the
cost-benefit-ratio of being moral versus immoral. This life is for the majority
of people neither practicable nor rewarding. (I couldn't do it.) To think that way
- cynically calculating - is simply to demanding and emotionally devastating. For
psychological health, it is much better to have faith in the morality of others
and the positive outcome of one's own consistent practice of morality, isn't it?

A:  The "prudent predator" idea is inherent, not in rationality in the
Objectivist sense, but rather in pragmatism.  Objectivism recognizes that the world
is so complex and so replete with subtle interconnections that such calculations
are impossible, so that we must be guided by ethical principles rather than case-by-case
analyses.  (In the Human Action Course, see subsection 3.4 on "Ethics and Principles,"
which in turn draws upon pages 1.3:63-4 in my discussion of epistemology.)

Furthermore, the notion that a rationality-based life could undermine one's psychological
health is self-contradictory, since rationality requires that we live in a way that
is consistent with our health, both physical and psychological.

> Furthermore, I suspect, that a society based on a truly objective code of ethics
would be closer to fascism then to democracy. (But I'm not sure about that.)

A:  As I see it, when we speak of a society based on an objective code of ethics,
we mean that social relationships do not violate fundamental ethical principles,
in particular the principle of non-initiation of force.  In contrast, societies
in which individual lifestyles are required to adhere to detailed codes of behavior
(such as fascism or theocracy) violate this principle and are therefore fundamentally
inconsistent with objective ethics.  Consequently, a society based on objective
ethics is at the opposite pole from a fascist or theocratic system.

The source of your confusion, I think, is the Fallacy of Political Reductionism
(pp. 3.12:13 ff. in the course).  Logically, the proposition that a certain behavior
is ethical does NOT imply that it would be ethical to enforce that behavior among
others by coercive means.  As I point out at the end of that section, in an objective-ethics-based
society the proper use of force has nothing to do with making citizens more "moral."
Rather, the citizens of such a society may use force to defend their own lives and
property, as they pursue the ultimate moral goal of enhancing their own lives.

> So some elements of faith are probably rational in the context of one's overall
psychological well-being. What do you think? Am I right?

A:  No, I have to disagree.  If I understand the gist of your entire paragraph correctly,
you're suggesting that some faith-based motive is needed for pursuing ethical principles.
A major purpose of my Human Action Course, however, is to show that such principles
properly derive from our rational understanding of reality; that is, there exist
rational, understandable reasons for acting ethically, so that no recourse to a
leap of faith is necessary.  For instance, the reasons for the non-initiation of
force principle are discussed at length in subsection 3.12 ("Ethics in Society"),
and an enormous body of additional support for this principle can be distilled from
the rest of the course.
----
I hope you are taking good care of your physical health, because I think that is
an important key to attaining a positive psychological outlook and a strong sense
of self-efficacy and self-worth.

Rob
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Alexander, 6/27/03:
> A:  As I interpret Objectivism, its central principle is
> adherence to objective reality--that is, "facts" always come
> first, so there can by definition be no "clash with facts."  Of
> course, it's quite possible that some specific statements of Ayn
> Rand may have clashed with reality, and indeed I think a few of
> them did.  But as I view it, a true Objectivist should go with
> the facts in such cases, and not with any "received doctrine."
> My view, of course, might not make some ARI people very happy.

That's how I think Objectivism should be also. The empirical should always
has primacy over the logical. But if it were really that way in Objectivism,
it would look for real world ethics into evolutionary psychology, not only
Rand's writings.


> Also, I think it is necessary to distinguish between (1)
> epistemological certainty in the philosophical sense and (2)
> psychological self-confidence.  It is quite possible for one to
> have a valid basis for logical or epistemological certainty
> regarding an issue, yet at the same time to harbor some internal
> qualms about it.  Human psychology, after all, is very complex,
> and the logical connections we make through our consciousness are
> not always immediately and fully integrated down to the core of our being.

I believe one cannot separate the two. If one's feelings contradict one's
publicly stated philosophy one is in reality believing something different
without admitting it to oneself. It is not only a matter of integration but
of understanding - certainty comes with it.


> A:  Yes, but obviously when Objectivists talk about spirituality
> they cannot mean it in the traditional sense, since traditionally
> spirituality is entirely identified with religion.  Fortunately,
> I was not brought up in a religious tradition, so I find it
> easier to think about matters of spirit without the religious baggage.

Me too. I was - and consciously still am - an out-and-out materialist and
determinist. But through my illness I discovered that I have "religious
needs" too.


> A:  I agree.  The beliefs are important, and their concretization
> through art, literature, and other means is important as well.  I
> think there is plenty of room for more creative thinking among
> Objectivists about how we can fulfill our spiritual needs.

For Objectivism to have success on a wide scale some traditional forms of
spirituality should be added - ideally without corrupting the core message:
that true rationality and selfishness are the cardinal virtues.


> A:  I'm not sure how you reach this conclusion.  Again, if the
> term "spirituality" is understood in a broader sense, and not
> merely as a synonym for "religion," then I don't see any clash
> between rational conviction and spirituality.  That's not to say,
> of course, that rational conviction alone is enough to fulfill
> our spiritual needs.  But I do believe it is the right starting point.

The sciences are materialistic and deterministic. Spirituality (and human
happiness I believe) relies on the opposite doctrines. Spirituality means
not only "pertaining to consciousness" as Branden says, it contains specific
beliefs Objectivism and the sciences traditionally reject. Spirituality
without these elements is shallow, I believe. But what Objectivism can and
should do is in my opinion, to create and practice rituals similar those
which can be found in Christianity.


> A:  In my moments of most profound discouragement, I have felt
> something similar to this--a profound wish that there existed
> some higher force that could help me through my problems.  In
> retrospect, though, it really was a wish rather than a need, for
> I was eventually able to pull myself out of my depression, with
> some assistance from other people (and not other-worldly
> sources).  If I use the definition from my course, a "need" as "a
> thing that is required to maintain or enhance the life of an
> organism."  And without a doubt I have been able, not merely to
> maintain my life, but to enhance it greatly, without the benefit
> of some "higher" intervention.

That's how it should be. It could be inspiring to hear the whole story.
Would you mind telling me more? I find the distinction between "wish"
and "need" very helpful. I wish only it could be present in my mind when I
experience these (partially overwhelming) wishes.


> One thing that I find helpful is to learn to trust in the power
> of my subconscious.  As I point out in the course, the
> subconscious is in the long run programmed by the ideas and
> values generated by the conscious mind.  Consequently, if one
> consciously embraces positive and life-affirming premises, then
> in the long run the subconscious part of one's mind will also
> assist in guiding one's life in a positive direction.
> Furthermore, precisely because it is not part of consciousness,
> the subconscious is perceived as a kind of "other," and therefore
> can provide the kind of "outside" assistance for which we
> sometimes experience a deep emotional craving.

If emotions has their root in the subconscious, then my subconscious is my
enemy. What if one's emotions are overwhelmingly strong so that they corrupt
conscious thinking? There are illnesses, for example bipolar disorder, where
this is regularly the case. It is not always that easy with the primacy of
thinking over feeling as Objectivism wants us to make believe. How can I
trust my subconscious under these circumstances?


> A:  The "prudent predator" idea is inherent, not in rationality
> in the Objectivist sense, but rather in pragmatism.  Objectivism
> recognizes that the world is so complex and so replete with
> subtle interconnections that such calculations are impossible, so
> that we must be guided by ethical principles rather than
> case-by-case analyses.  (In the Human Action Course, see
> subsection 3.4 on "Ethics and Principles," which in turn draws
> upon pages 1.3:63-4 in my discussion of epistemology.)
>
> Furthermore, the notion that a rationality-based life could
> undermine one's psychological health is self-contradictory, since
> rationality requires that we live in a way that is consistent
> with our health, both physical and psychological.

Okay, I meant indeed case-by-case intellectual effort (en detail). When you
accept that principles are more economical then case-by-case analysis, then
you are still rational in a certain, general sense. It is good that you
reminded me reading again what you wrote about that in your course.


> A:  As I see it, when we speak of a society based on an objective
> code of ethics, we mean that social relationships do not violate
> fundamental ethical principles, in particular the principle of
> non-initiation of force.  In contrast, societies in which
> individual lifestyles are required to adhere to detailed codes of
> behavior (such as fascism or theocracy) violate this principle
> and are therefore fundamentally inconsistent with objective
> ethics.  Consequently, a society based on objective ethics is at
> the opposite pole from a fascist or theocratic system.

No, I really meant that it is possible that an truly objective code of
ethics might disregard the doctrine of the harmony of interests ~advocating~
the initiation of force when it suits the interests of one's interest group.


> The source of your confusion, I think, is the Fallacy of
> Political Reductionism (pp. 3.12:13 ff. in the course).
> Logically, the proposition that a certain behavior is ethical
> does NOT imply that it would be ethical to enforce that behavior
> among others by coercive means.  As I point out at the end of
> that section, in an objective-ethics-based society the proper use
> of force has nothing to do with making citizens more "moral."
> Rather, the citizens of such a society may use force to defend
> their own lives and property, as they pursue the ultimate moral
> goal of enhancing their own lives.

I worked through this section of your course and must say that one's
interest group might still be rational to advocate the redistribution of
resources to its own advantage, in effect robbing other, less powerful
groups in society.


> A:  No, I have to disagree.  If I understand the gist of your
> entire paragraph correctly, you're suggesting that some
> faith-based motive is needed for pursuing ethical principles.  A
> major purpose of my Human Action Course, however, is to show that
> such principles properly derive from our rational understanding
> of reality; that is, there exist rational, understandable reasons
> for acting ethically, so that no recourse to a leap of faith is
> necessary.  For instance, the reasons for the non-initiation of
> force principle are discussed at length in subsection 3.12
> ("Ethics in Society"), and an enormous body of additional support
> for this principle can be distilled from the rest of the course.

I'm not sure how it can be sold to individual social groups which profit
from governmental redistribution of wealth that the non-initiation of force
principle applied consistently is good for them. Libertarians - especially
those who can only argue with morality - are doomed in a world full of
pragmatists.


> I hope you are taking good care of your physical health, because
> I think that is an important key to attaining a positive
> psychological outlook and a strong sense of self-efficacy and self-worth.

My constitution is indeed not stable. I need regular training - or cognitive
therapy.

Alexander
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Rob, 8/4/03:

> The empirical should always has primacy over the logical. But if it were really that way in
> Objectivism, it would look for real world ethics into evolutionary psychology, not only Rand's > writings.

A:  I don't think that the empirical and the logical can ever be in conflict in the first place, unless one subscribes to some system of false logic.  After all, you'll never find any empirical evidence that A is not A, or that contradictions exist (that is, a thing has a property and does not have that property at the same time and in the same respect), or that a certain valid proposition is neither true nor false.  The logical, if it is properly construed, never conflicts with the empirical; the former just provides a framework for understanding the latter.

Similarly, a philosophical system such as Objectivism provides a framework for interpreting our real-world experience.  For example, the framework of Objectivism includes some generalized ethical principles, which we must combine with concrete data from our experience in order to arrive at courses of action.  (Cf. my discussion of the "practical syllogism," beginning at http://www.mindspring.com/~cunningr/pp/cc/HH02004.html.)  As a philosophical system, Objectivism does not tell us directly whether or not Marx's labor theory of value is correct, for example,
or whether or not certain psychological traits have been imparted to human beings by millions of years of evolution.  What Objectivism does provide is an outlook on reality, whereby one positively accepts the facts of reality and integrates them in a logically coherent manner.  This outlook becomes essential if we are to be able to trust our own conclusions as we explore such areas as praxeology and evolutionary psychology.  In any case, I'm sure Ayn Rand never intended that her own ideas should make it unnecessary to pursue further research into economics, psychology, or any other concrete scientific field.  By the way, you're not the only Objectivist I know who also has a strong interest in evolutionary psychology.
----------
>> It is quite possible for one to
>> have a valid basis for logical or epistemological certainty
>> regarding an issue, yet at the same time to harbor some internal
>> qualms about it.  Human psychology, after all, is very complex,
>> and the logical connections we make through our consciousness are
>> not always immediately and fully integrated down to the core of our being.

> I believe one cannot separate the two. If one's feelings contradict one's
> publicly stated philosophy one is in reality believing something different
> without admitting it to oneself. It is not only a matter of integration
> but of understanding - certainty comes with it.

A:  I think that it is possible to believe something on one level, while disbelieving it on another--at least if one is psychologically conflicted.  My main point is that feelings of doubt do not in themselves constitute knowledge or even a basis for knowledge.  A person might possess all of the data and arguments necessary to draw correct, definitive logical conclusions regarding issue X, perhaps even having thought through the matter enough to have arrived at philosophical certainty about X.  Yet, if that same person harbors fundamental doubts about his own thinking processes, he might still doubt his own conclusion somewhere deep inside.  The doubts don't represent valid knowledge about X, although they do provide some insight into the person's own psychological state.
----------
> ...through my illness I discovered that I have "religious needs" too.

A:  I'm assuming that by "needs" you mean something more than "wishes"--that is, you mean that something in religion can make your life objectively better in the long run.  Since other things in religion can be destructive to life (as I think you would agree from the historical record), that would make it particularly important to isolate what the beneficial element(s) might be, and to consider how they might be obtained without all of the accompanying harmful baggage.  Perhaps the beneficial element is one you allude to later--namely, "rituals."
----------
> For Objectivism to have success on a wide scale some traditional forms of spirituality should
> be added - ideally without corrupting the core message:  that true rationality and selfishness > are the cardinal virtues.

A:  I agree, except that I'm not sure that spirituality as practiced by Objectivists would be very "traditional."
----------
> The sciences are materialistic and deterministic.

A:  My understanding of "science" is broader than yours.  The word, after all, comes from a Latin root referring simply to "knowledge."  The Objectivist outlook on reality (and hence on knowledge of reality) is not deterministic or purely materialistic, in contrast to Marxism and many other modern doctrines.  Yes, Objectivists recognize that there exists a physical reality and physical laws, but we do not reduce reality to its material aspect. 
----------
> Spirituality (and human happiness I believe) relies on the opposite doctrines. Spirituality
> means not only "pertaining to consciousness" as Branden says, it contains specific beliefs
> Objectivism and the sciences traditionally reject.

A:  What specific beliefs, inherent in spirituality, are rejected by Objectivism, or by science as understood by Objectivism?
----------
> But what Objectivism can and should do is in my opinion, to create and practice rituals similar those which can be found in Christianity.

A:  I am most curious to see your ideas as to what specific rituals might be incorporated into spirituality as practiced by Objectivists, and how they might support an Objectivist sense of life.
----------
>> In my moments of most profound discouragement, I have felt something similar to this--a
>> profound wish that there existed some higher force that could help me through my problems.  In
>> retrospect, though, it really was a wish rather than a need, for I was eventually able to pull
>> myself out of my depression, with some assistance from other people (and not other-worldly
>> sources)...

> That's how it should be. It could be inspiring to hear the whole story.  Would you mind telling > me more?

A:  I've been a little reluctant to talk about it.  I think that's part of the reason I didn't respond immediately to your note.  But I experienced profound depression in the latter part of 2000, lasting well into 2001.  Much of it could be attributed to my existential circumstances at the time.  For one thing, I had tried for most of two decades to make a transition into a second career as a composer.  This effort culminated with my receiving a PhD in music theory in May 1999--a degree which I was never able to parlay into a job position.  Consequently, I returned to my first career as a computer systems analyst, albeit at a much lower salary than before.  In general, I was feeling a profound sense of inefficacy, particularly in my dealings with other people.  I believed (and continue to believe) that I have much more to offer the world, but that my social inadequacy makes it impossible for me ever to "sell" to other people what I had to offer.  It seemed as if intelligence and skill counted for nothing in a world where success was based on "who you know," on natural gregariousness and willingness to cozy up to influential people and play the popularity game.  (In the midst of all this inner turmoil, I was hard at work on my Human Action website.)

I was helped through this crisis by a young psychologist (actually a doctoral student in training at Florida State University), who used techniques drawn from Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy (CBT), as well as some other supportive people around me.

I continue to believe that I have much more to offer the world than I will ever be able to "sell," but I have largely come to terms with it--partly through the understanding that what is really important is what I can do for my own life, and not for the world at large.  Nevertheless, this conflict still makes me feel discouraged or angry at times.
-----------
> If emotions has their root in the subconscious, then my subconscious is my enemy. What if one's
> emotions are overwhelmingly strong so that they corrupt conscious thinking? There are
> illnesses, for example bipolar disorder, where this is regularly the case. It is not always
> that easy with the primacy of thinking over feeling as Objectivism wants us to make believe.
> How can I trust my subconscious under these circumstances?

A:  You're right, it isn't always easy.  I think that knowing that you have the disorder is a good first step, since you can be alert to the possibility that your feelings may represent a temporary aberration brought on by the disorder.  I think that ideas drawn from the CBT approach can play a useful role here in helping to determine whether or not your feelings of the moment are really justified by the facts.  But you're right:  a psychological condition like that makes things more complicated.
-----------
> I really meant that it is possible that an truly objective code of ethics might disregard the
> doctrine of the harmony of interests~advocating~the initiation of force when it suits the
> interests of one's interest group.

A:  I don't think it's just a matter of "doctrine":  the initiation of force really does act against one's interests in the long run, particularly when one factors in all the indirect effects, looking at psychological and social dynamics and not merely immediate economic interest.  And an objective approach to ethics requires that one look at ALL the causal factors in objective reality.
-----------
> I'm not sure how it can be sold to individual social groups which profit from governmental
> redistribution of wealth that the non-initiation of force principle applied consistently is
> good for them.

A:  Well, as I indicated above, I'm not an expert at selling.  I can only offer logical arguments, and hope that they will persuade people who are willing to listen to reason.  Perhaps we could be more successful if we address our ideas, not to "social groups" per se, but to one individual at a time.  After all, the myriad needs of an individual are much more complex than the demands of any single interest group.  Those needs also transcend economics, contrary to the claims of Karl Marx.
-----------
> My constitution is indeed not stable. I need regular training - or cognitive therapy.

A:  Or both.  I strive for "mens sana in corpor sano."

Rob
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Alexander, 8/6/03:

A:  I don't think that the empirical and the logical can ever be in
conflictin the first place, unless one subscribes to some system of false logic.
After all, you'll never find any empirical evidence that A is not A, or
that contradictions exist (that is, a thing has a property and does not have
that property at the same time and in the same respect), or that a certain
valid proposition is neither true nor false.  The logical, if it is properly
construed, never conflicts with the empirical; the former just provides a
framework for understanding the latter.

>> The logical is just about non-contradiction, it says nothing about the
factual reality of its elements. Of course, ultimately, if a system of
thought is firmly grounded in empirical facts, you can have a smooth, i.e.
logical transition between the different levels of abstraction. But, in
contrast to the sciences, not all philosophical systems (if they are systems
at all) are constructed that way. It is possible to have logically totally
closed systems with no possibility of empirical validation or such logical
systems where contrary empirical evidence is given. I believe that outside
the sciences most idea systems (70-80%) are pure rationalism.


A: Similarly, a philosophical system such as Objectivism provides a
framework for interpreting our real-world experience.  For example, the
framework of Objectivism includes some generalized ethical principles,
which we must combine with concrete data from our experience in order to arrive
at courses of action.

>> Do you think that the Objectivist virtues are realistic in that they
are leading to this-worldly success?

A: (Cf. my discussion of the "practical syllogism," beginning at
http://www.mindspring.com/~cunningr/pp/cc/HH02004.html.)  As a
philosophical
system, Objectivism does not tell us directly whether or not Marx's labor
theory of value is correct, for example, or whether or not certain
psychological traits have been imparted to human beings by millions of
years
of evolution.  What Objectivism does provide is an outlook on reality,
whereby one positively accepts the facts of reality and integrates them in
a
logically coherent manner.  This outlook becomes essential if we are to be
able to trust our own conclusions as we explore such areas as praxeology
and
evolutionary psychology.

>> I'm not sure to understand. Would you explain how the Objectivist
outlook
on reality is essential to trusting our own conclusions?


A: In any case, I'm sure Ayn Rand never intended that her own ideas should
make it unnecessary to pursue further research into economics, psychology,
or any other concrete scientific field.  By the way, you're not the only
Objectivist I know who also has a strong interest in evolutionary
psychology.

>> But as far as I can see, none of it translated in a re-examination of
the
Objectivist ethics...


----------
>> It is quite possible for one to
>> have a valid basis for logical or epistemological certainty
>> regarding an issue, yet at the same time to harbor some internal
>> qualms about it.  Human psychology, after all, is very complex,
>> and the logical connections we make through our consciousness are
>> not always immediately and fully integrated down to the core of our
being.

> I believe one cannot separate the two. If one's feelings contradict
one's
> publicly stated philosophy one is in reality believing something
different
> without admitting it to oneself. It is not only a matter of integration
> but of understanding - certainty comes with it.

A:  I think that it is possible to believe something on one level, while
disbelieving it on another--at least if one is psychologically conflicted.
My main point is that feelings of doubt do not in themselves constitute
knowledge or even a basis for knowledge.  A person might possess all of
the
data and arguments necessary to draw correct, definitive logical
conclusions
regarding issue X, perhaps even having thought through the matter enough
to
have arrived at philosophical certainty about X.  Yet, if that same person
harbors fundamental doubts about his own thinking processes, he might
still
doubt his own conclusion somewhere deep inside.  The doubts don't
represent
valid knowledge about X, although they do provide some insight into the
person's own psychological state.

>> I don't understand your example. How can one have philosophical
certainty
and doubt at the same time? You mean "potential for certainty", right?


----------
> ...through my illness I discovered that I have "religious needs" too.

A:  I'm assuming that by "needs" you mean something more than
"wishes"--that
is, you mean that something in religion can make your life objectively
better in the long run.  Since other things in religion can be destructive
to life (as I think you would agree from the historical record), that
would
make it particularly important to isolate what the beneficial element(s)
might be, and to consider how they might be obtained without all of the
accompanying harmful baggage.  Perhaps the beneficial element is one you
allude to later--namely, "rituals."

>> Well, not only (physical) rituals, perhaps even epistemological
principles, faith for example.


----------
> The sciences are materialistic and deterministic.

A:  My understanding of "science" is broader than yours.  The word, after
all, comes from a Latin root referring simply to "knowledge."  The
Objectivist outlook on reality (and hence on knowledge of reality) is not
deterministic or purely materialistic, in contrast to Marxism and many
other
modern doctrines.  Yes, Objectivists recognize that there exists a
physical
reality and physical laws, but we do not reduce reality to its material
aspect.

>> I know that Objectivists don't do that, but to what else should it be
reduced? You can trace back all effects to physical entities (whether they
are ultimately "materialistic" or not).


----------
> Spirituality (and human happiness I believe) relies on the opposite
doctrines. Spirituality
> means not only "pertaining to consciousness" as Branden says, it
contains
specific beliefs
> Objectivism and the sciences traditionally reject.

A:  What specific beliefs, inherent in spirituality, are rejected by
Objectivism, or by science as understood by Objectivism?

>> According to Branden theism, self-transcendence, mysticism and
selflessness.


----------
A:  I am most curious to see your ideas as to what specific rituals might
be
incorporated into spirituality as practiced by Objectivists, and how they
might support an Objectivist sense of life.

>> That's the problem. In my opinion, it wouldn't support an Objectivist
sense of life. Rather it would give the people something higher then
themselves that they can admire and trust.


----------
A:  I've been a little reluctant to talk about it.  I think that's part of
the reason I didn't respond immediately to your note.

>> You're right. I shouldn't have asked in the first place. At times I am
somewhat insensitive. If so, don't hesitate to tell me.


A:  But I experienced profound depression in the latter part of 2000,
lasting well into 2001.  Much of it could be attributed to my existential
circumstances at the time.  For one thing, I had tried for most of two
decades to make a transition into a second career as a composer.  This
effort culminated with my receiving a PhD in music theory in May 1999--a
degree which I was never able to parlay into a job position.
Consequently,
I returned to my first career as a computer systems analyst, albeit at a
much lower salary than before.  In general, I was feeling a profound sense
of inefficacy, particularly in my dealings with other people.  I believed
(and continue to believe) that I have much more to offer the world, but
that
my social inadequacy makes it impossible for me ever to "sell" to other
people what I had to offer.  It seemed as if intelligence and skill
counted
for nothing in a world where success was based on "who you know," on
natural
gregariousness and willingness to cozy up to influential people and play
the
popularity game.  (In the midst of all this inner turmoil, I was hard at
work on my Human Action website.)

I was helped through this crisis by a young psychologist (actually a
doctoral student in training at Florida State University), who used
techniques drawn from Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy (CBT), as well as some
other supportive people around me.

I continue to believe that I have much more to offer the world than I will
ever be able to "sell," but I have largely come to terms with it--partly
through the understanding that what is really important is what I can do
for
my own life, and not for the world at large.  Nevertheless, this conflict
still makes me feel discouraged or angry at times.

>> I can understand you very good. We indeed live in a world where
extroverts are seen as having more to offer, but, being an introvert
myself,
I don't think that's true. It seems that all you need to flourish is the
right social environment. To create this environment for myself was a
great
part of my motivation behind popularizing Objectivism in Germany. If
people
come together who share some core values this is still possible. We just
have to find each other in the jungle out there.


-----------
A:  You're right, it isn't always easy.  I think that knowing that you
have
the disorder is a good first step, since you can be alert to the
possibility
that your feelings may represent a temporary aberration brought on by the
disorder.  I think that ideas drawn from the CBT approach can play a
useful
role here in helping to determine whether or not your feelings of the
moment
are really justified by the facts.  But you're right:  a psychological
condition like that makes things more complicated.


>> Such disorders can make life a constant fight with irrational thoughts
and feelings.


-----------
A:  I don't think it's just a matter of "doctrine":  the initiation of
force
really does act against one's interests in the long run, particularly when
one factors in all the indirect effects, looking at psychological and
social
dynamics and not merely immediate economic interest.  And an objective
approach to ethics requires that one look at ALL the causal factors in
objective reality.

>> I agree. But it is also obvious that some people are quite happy and
successful through violating this principle. The negative internal
consequences don't seem to exist for them. So it would be irrational for
them to see the non-initiation of force principle as something absolute.
History is full of successful criminals and successful tyrants.


-----------
> I'm not sure how it can be sold to individual social groups which profit
from governmental
> redistribution of wealth that the non-initiation of force principle
applied consistently is
> good for them.

A:  Well, as I indicated above, I'm not an expert at selling.  I can only
offer logical arguments, and hope that they will persuade people who are
willing to listen to reason.  Perhaps we could be more successful if we
address our ideas, not to "social groups" per se, but to one individual at
a
time.  After all, the myriad needs of an individual are much more complex
than the demands of any single interest group.  Those needs also transcend
economics, contrary to the claims of Karl Marx.

>> I'm pessimistic, but I hope you are right. By the way, if
Marxism/Leninism weren't exposed as falsehoods, such as in the early days,
I
'd probably be a Marxist. A truly intellectual movement like this -- on
all
levels -- is missing for capitalism. It would be grounded in facts.

Alexander
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Rob, 8/8/03:

> The logical is just about non-contradiction, it says nothing about the factual reality of its elements. Of course, ultimately, if a system of thought is firmly grounded in empirical facts, you can have a smooth, i.e. logical transition between the different levels of abstraction. But, in contrast to the sciences, not all philosophical systems (if they are systems at all) are constructed that way. It is possible to have logically totally closed systems with no possibility of empirical validation or such logical systems where contrary empirical evidence is given. I believe that outside the sciences most idea systems (70-80%) are pure rationalism.

A:  According to Rand, logic is the art of noncontradictory identification of reality, and this is the view that I expand at length near the beginning of the Human Action course.  When you say that "the logical is just about non-contradiction," you reduce that definition to just one of its elements.  As understood by Objectivism, logic includes inductive logic as well as deductive logic.  Indeed, according to Objectivist epistemology, the two cannot even be neatly separated in the first place, since coherent concepts must ultimately be grounded in experience and since one cannot reason deductively without coherent concepts.

Now it is true that philosophers such as Descartes attempted to formulate purely rationalistic systems of logic, divorced from our experience of reality.  Objectivism explicitly rejects such views, however.  And it is Objectivism that we were discussing in the first place, not these other rationalistic approaches.  This discussion started with your claim that "the empirical should always has primacy over the logical" and your complaint that Objectivism did not grant such primacy.
--------------
> Do you think that the Objectivist virtues are realistic in that they are leading to this-worldly success?

A:  Very much so, provided that they are interpreted properly--that is, thoughtfully and non-mechanistically.  See Section 3.4 in the course.
--------------
> I'm not sure to understand. Would you explain how the Objectivist outlook on reality is essential to trusting our own conclusions?

A:  To explain this in detail would be to repeat the first part of my course.  But basically, Objectivist epistemology, in contrast to other epistemological approaches, insists that our all of our concepts (and, consequently, our logical thinking) should be grounded in our percepts, which are in turn grounded in our sensations, which are generated by our sense organs, which are themselves part of physical reality.  Consequently, our knowledge has a very direct connection to reality, so that we don't need constantly to doubt whether it is "realistic" or not.  (We do, of course, need to keep our concepts up to date with our most recent experience; that is, as Rand said, concepts are contextual.)  Only when we start to posit sources of "knowledge" that are not connected to our experience of reality (i. e., "faith") do we need to become distrustful of that "knowledge."

In addition to my course, I'd recommend close reading of Rand's Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, if you haven't already done so.  In a way, it is her most important work.
---------------
>> In any case, I'm sure Ayn Rand never intended that her own ideas should make it unnecessary to pursue further research into economics, psychology, or any other concrete scientific field.  By the way, you're not the only Objectivist I know who also has a strong interest in evolutionary
psychology.

> But as far as I can see, none of it translated in a re-examination of the Objectivist ethics...

A:  I don't really understand your complaint.  If you were to expand Rand's discussion of ethics with insights from evolutionary psychology, for example, I think that would be entirely in keeping with the spirit of Objectivism.  I don't think that such work would conflict in any significant way with her espousal of rational egoism, or with what she said about rationality, honesty, justice, and the other virtues.  You would be merely fleshing out the basic structure, at most perhaps making some minor alterations.  And if your complaint is that Rand did not herself incorporate evolutionary psychology into her writings--haven't many of the most specific ideas in the area come out only since her death?

Concepts are contextual--which means, you need to formulate them in your mind in the context of your present experience of reality, not merely in terms of what was known during Rand's lifetime.
---------------
>> A person might possess all of the data and arguments necessary to draw correct, definitive logical conclusions regarding issue X, perhaps even having thought through the matter enough to
have arrived at philosophical certainty about X.  Yet, if that same person harbors fundamental doubts about his own thinking processes, he might still doubt his own conclusion somewhere deep inside.  The doubts don't represent valid knowledge about X, although they do provide some insight into the person's own psychological state.

> I don't understand your example. How can one have philosophical certainty and doubt at the same time? You mean "potential for certainty", right?

A:  It seems to me that this is a matter of common experience.  For example, a certain airline passenger might have recently taken enough advanced courses in aerodynamics to know intellectually that his plane was very safe, and that the probability that it would crash was extremely minute.  Yet he might still experience a shiver of fear during take-off.  On the intellectual level, such a passenger knows that the plane is safe; yet on some subconscious level, he still harbors some emotional doubt, some phobia of crashing, left over from childhood, perhaps because he at some point lost a relative to such a crash.  Over time, if he keeps reminding himself of what he knows intellectually, his fear should decrease, particularly if he acts upon his intellectual knowledge by deliberately and progressively desensitizing himself to the experience of flying.  I daresay that most of us experience such conflicts from time to time.  I certainly do, even though I consider myself relatively healthy and more well-integrated than most.

What happens with aeronautical knowledge can also happen with philosophical knowledge.  For example, I know philosophically that evil is fundamentally impotent, that it can succeed only insofar as good people, because of their internal confusion, unwittingly give it support.  Yet in times of discouragement I may feel moments of despair, when old doubts (perhaps vestiges of feelings from my childhood, when I didn't know everything I do today philosophically) taint my vision of reality--because my thinking is not 100% integrated.  (Whose thinking is?)
---------------
>> I'm assuming that by "needs" you mean something more than "wishes"--that is, you mean that something in religion can make your life objectively better in the long run.  Since other things in religion can be destructive to life (as I think you would agree from the historical record), that would make it particularly important to isolate what the beneficial element(s) might be, and to consider how they might be obtained without all of the accompanying harmful baggage.  Perhaps the beneficial element is one you allude to later--namely, "rituals."

> Well, not only (physical) rituals, perhaps even epistemological principles, faith for example.

A:  If we literally had a need for faith in our epistemology, that would mean that it is objectively better for our lives if we adopt beliefs about reality that cannot be induced from our experience of reality, or even from rational reflection on that experience.  (I'm using the term "faith" just as it is used by deeply religious people, who make a point of upholding it in antithesis to reason.)  This assumption leads to a number of problems.  First, how can beliefs that are not derived from reality facilitate our interaction with that reality?  And how can beliefs that don't help us to interact with reality better make our lives better?  Also, it is obvious that some faith-based beliefs are harmful; for example, some people who subscribe to faith-healing end up dying for lack of science-based medical treatment.  So how do we insure that we only adopt only the "beneficial" faith-based beliefs, and not the harmful ones, if the beliefs are truly based on pure faith rather than reason?  Of course, this whole way of looking at the issue would be rejected by a person of true faith, since it requires that one uses a process of reason and logic instead of faith.
----------------
>> Objectivists ... do not reduce reality to its material aspect.

>> I know that Objectivists don't do that, but to what else should it be reduced? You can trace back all effects to physical entities (whether they are ultimately "materialistic" or not).

A:  Why try to reduce reality at all, if it means trying to make reality less than it is?  Consciousness is a phenomenon of nature, just as matter is, and hence it cannot properly be ignored.  And even if consciousness is only possessed by beings that also have a physical existence, we have no way of explaining or understanding the former purely in terms of the latter.
----------------
>> What specific beliefs, inherent in spirituality, are rejected by Objectivism, or by science as understood by Objectivism?

> According to Branden theism, self-transcendence, mysticism and selflessness.

A:  None of those things are INHERENT in spirituality, and I think you must have misinterpreted Branden if you think he said so.  We may have a language problem here:  "inherent," according to my dictionary, means "involved in the constitution or essential character of something."  The things that you list are not essential to spirituality; they are not part of what is necessary to constitute spirituality.  They are, of course, traditionally associated with spirituality, but Objectivism isn't a traditionalist philosophy.
----------------
>> I am most curious to see your ideas as to what specific rituals might be incorporated into spirituality as practiced by Objectivists, and how they might support an Objectivist sense of life.

> That's the problem. In my opinion, it wouldn't support an Objectivist sense of life. Rather it would give the people something higher then themselves that they can admire and trust.

A:  If you'll look back at my earlier e-mail, you'll see that my curiosity arose from your statement that "what Objectivism can and should do is in my opinion, to create and practice rituals similar those which can be found in Christianity."  So are you suggesting that Objectivism ought to promote a kind of spirituality that, by your own admission, would fail to support an Objectivist sense of life?

In any case, your suggestion would not really "give the people something higher then themselves that they can admire and trust."  At best, it would give them the false illusion of such a thing. But what is worse is that it would leave them with the deep, desperately-to-be-evaded knowledge that they had failed to follow a standard of reason consistently and therefore could no longer trust the conclusions of their own consciousness.
----------------
> To create this environment for myself was a great part of my motivation behind popularizing Objectivism in Germany. If people come together who share some core values this is still possible. We just have to find each other in the jungle out there.

A:  I sincerely hope that you will not abandon that effort.  I think such mutual support is immensely beneficial to the spirit.
----------------
> But it is also obvious that some people are quite happy and successful through violating this principle. The negative internal consequences don't seem to exist for them. So it would be irrational for them to see the non-initiation of force principle as something absolute.  History is full of successful criminals and successful tyrants.

A:  More typically, though, the lives of criminals and tyrants are short and brutal, filled with (well-justified) paranoia, and often terminating with grisly deaths.  If I remember correctly, Stalin died because he could not trust his own doctors (I've forgotten the details.)  And what happened to Hitler, to Mussolini, and to Louis XVI?  (Cf. http://www.mindspring.com/~cunningr/pp/cf/HI20067.html ff.)  Of course, a particular criminal or tyrant might beat the odds, thus remaining what you call "successful."  But any such individual plays a very risky game; if he is truly "happy," as you suggest, then that is because he is blissfully ignorant of the danger around the corner.  The smarter criminal or tyrant lives in constant fearful watch, lest he be betrayed by his companion thugs.  And the smartest criminal or tyrant--well, if he's that smart, he doesn't become a criminal or a tyrant in the first place.  Yes, practicing the non-initiation-of-force principle is indeed essential to one's true self-interest.  Persuading people of this fact of nature, on the other hand, is a non-trivial task.

Rob
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Alexander, 8/11/03:
A:  According to Rand, logic is the art of noncontradictory identification
of reality, and this is the view that I expand at length near the
beginning
of the Human Action course.  When you say that "the logical is just about
non-contradiction," you reduce that definition to just one of its
elements.
As understood by Objectivism, logic includes inductive logic as well as
deductive logic.  Indeed, according to Objectivist epistemology, the two
cannot even be neatly separated in the first place, since coherent
concepts
must ultimately be grounded in experience and since one cannot reason
deductively without coherent concepts.

Now it is true that philosophers such as Descartes attempted to formulate
purely rationalistic systems of logic, divorced from our experience of
reality.  Objectivism explicitly rejects such views, however.  And it is
Objectivism that we were discussing in the first place, not these other
rationalistic approaches.  This discussion started with your claim that
"the
empirical should always has primacy over the logical" and your complaint
that Objectivism did not grant such primacy.

>> Not that it rejects such primacy explicitly, but that it ignores the
(empirical) sciences by, for example, rejecting materialism/determinism
and
evolutionary psychology. At least this is true for the orthodoxy.


--------------
A:  To explain this in detail would be to repeat the first part of my
course.  But basically, Objectivist epistemology, in contrast to other
epistemological approaches, insists that our all of our concepts (and,
consequently, our logical thinking) should be grounded in our percepts,
which are in turn grounded in our sensations, which are generated by our
sense organs, which are themselves part of physical reality.
Consequently,
our knowledge has a very direct connection to reality, so that we don't
need
constantly to doubt whether it is "realistic" or not.

>> Yes, normally this is the case. But you shouldn't dismiss at the same
time that especially strong emotions are powerful filters through which we
perceive reality on a higher, conceptual level. The first-level percepts
are
not the problem. Almost everyone can agree on their objectivity.


A:  (We do, of course, need to keep our concepts up to date with our most
recent experience; that is, as Rand said, concepts are contextual.)  Only
when we start to posit sources of "knowledge" that are not connected to
our
experience of reality (i. e., "faith") do we need to become distrustful of
that "knowledge."

In addition to my course, I'd recommend close reading of Rand's
Introduction
to Objectivist Epistemology, if you haven't already done so.  In a way, it
is her most important work.

>> I admit that I haven't finished ITOE because I found it to be to dry.
(If
it were in German I could probably stomach it.)


---------------
> But as far as I can see, none of it translated in a re-examination of
the
Objectivist ethics...

A:  I don't really understand your complaint.  If you were to expand
Rand's
discussion of ethics with insights from evolutionary psychology, for
example, I think that would be entirely in keeping with the spirit of
Objectivism.  I don't think that such work would conflict in any
significant
way with her espousal of rational egoism, or with what she said about
rationality, honesty, justice, and the other virtues.

>> I wouldn't be so sure about that. Consider that the biologically
rational
code of ethics is machiavellian in nature, that the survival of our gene
is
more important then our own survival on the individual level, that
individualism is not as strong as tribalism/nepotism, etc. I don't know if
you are a Sci-Fi fan, but there is a series, Gene Roddenberry's Andromeda,
where a humanoid race is depicted, which embodies all of these biological
virtues that I mentioned in fiction (the "Nietzscheans"). I even made a
website in an attempt to discuss and conceptualize this form of ethics.
Although I withdrew it later, I still think that this project is closer to
reality then traditional Objectivism.


A:  You would be merely fleshing out the basic structure, at most perhaps
making some minor alterations.  And if your complaint is that Rand did not
herself incorporate evolutionary psychology into her writings--haven't
many
of the most specific ideas in the area come out only since her death?

Concepts are contextual--which means, you need to formulate them in your
mind in the context of your present experience of reality, not merely in
terms of what was known during Rand's lifetime.

>> Agreed. But if one of the institutes will follow this advice, it surely
won't be the ARI. And who knows how long ~that~ will take. I need
something
to work with now.


---------------
>> A person might possess all of the data and arguments necessary to draw
correct, definitive logical conclusions regarding issue X, perhaps even
having thought through the matter enough to
have arrived at philosophical certainty about X.  Yet, if that same person
harbors fundamental doubts about his own thinking processes, he might
still
doubt his own conclusion somewhere deep inside.  The doubts don't
represent
valid knowledge about X, although they do provide some insight into the
person's own psychological state.

> I don't understand your example. How can one have philosophical
certainty
and doubt at the same time? You mean "potential for certainty", right?

A:  It seems to me that this is a matter of common experience.  For
example,
a certain airline passenger might have recently taken enough advanced
courses in aerodynamics to know intellectually that his plane was very
safe,
and that the probability that it would crash was extremely minute.  Yet he
might still experience a shiver of fear during take-off.  On the
intellectual level, such a passenger knows that the plane is safe; yet on
some subconscious level, he still harbors some emotional doubt, some
phobia
of crashing, left over from childhood, perhaps because he at some point
lost
a relative to such a crash.  Over time, if he keeps reminding himself of
what he knows intellectually, his fear should decrease, particularly if he
acts upon his intellectual knowledge by deliberately and progressively
desensitizing himself to the experience of flying.  I daresay that most of
us experience such conflicts from time to time.  I certainly do, even
though
I consider myself relatively healthy and more well-integrated than most.

>> But doesn't then doubt and certainty neutralize each other so that it
would be misleading to state that they coexist? Doesn't doubt, even on one
level, makes certainty impossible? (Maybe I am sidetracked by this issue.)


A:  What happens with aeronautical knowledge can also happen with
philosophical knowledge.  For example, I know philosophically that evil is
fundamentally impotent, that it can succeed only insofar as good people,
because of their internal confusion, unwittingly give it support.  Yet in
times of discouragement I may feel moments of despair, when old doubts
(perhaps vestiges of feelings from my childhood, when I didn't know
everything I do today philosophically) taint my vision of reality--because
my thinking is not 100% integrated.  (Whose thinking is?)

>> As you are talking of childhood experiences -- and I'm sorry if I
interrupt the flow of your thinking here -- do you believe psychodynamic
processes as laid out by Sigmund Freud are possible? (Objectivists
normally
don't think they are, I tend to believe that psychodynamic processes are
in
principle possible and worth identifying.)


---------------
>> I'm assuming that by "needs" you mean something more than
"wishes"--that
is, you mean that something in religion can make your life objectively
better in the long run.  Since other things in religion can be destructive
to life (as I think you would agree from the historical record), that
would
make it particularly important to isolate what the beneficial element(s)
might be, and to consider how they might be obtained without all of the
accompanying harmful baggage.  Perhaps the beneficial element is one you
allude to later--namely, "rituals."

> Well, not only (physical) rituals, perhaps even epistemological
principles, faith for example.

A:  If we literally had a need for faith in our epistemology, that would
mean that it is objectively better for our lives if we adopt beliefs about
reality that cannot be induced from our experience of reality, or even
from
rational reflection on that experience.  (I'm using the term "faith" just
as
it is used by deeply religious people, who make a point of upholding it in
antithesis to reason.)  This assumption leads to a number of problems.
First, how can beliefs that are not derived from reality facilitate our
interaction with that reality?  And how can beliefs that don't help us to
interact with reality better make our lives better?

>> Through a sense of calmness and trust that the world is just?


A:  Also, it is obvious that some faith-based beliefs are harmful; for
example, some people who subscribe to faith-healing end up dying for lack
of
science-based medical treatment.  So how do we insure that we only adopt
only the "beneficial" faith-based beliefs, and not the harmful ones, if
the
beliefs are truly based on pure faith rather than reason?  Of course, this
whole way of looking at the issue would be rejected by a person of true
faith, since it requires that one uses a process of reason and logic
instead
of faith.

>> Of course I wouldn't advocate faith that contradicts scientifically
established knowledge, such as in medicine. And to determine what are
beneficial faith-based beliefs we could investigate into what religions
are
doing traditionally. Do you think all religious beliefs contradict
scientific knowledge? There may be some which don't, but, again, I'm not
sure.


----------------
>> I know that Objectivists don't do that, but to what else should it be
reduced? You can trace back all effects to physical entities (whether they
are ultimately "materialistic" or not).

A:  Why try to reduce reality at all, if it means trying to make reality
less than it is?  Consciousness is a phenomenon of nature, just as matter
is, and hence it cannot properly be ignored.  And even if consciousness is
only possessed by beings that also have a physical existence, we have no
way
of explaining or understanding the former purely in terms of the latter.

>> It doesn't make reality less than it is, on the contrary, it helps us
understand and control reality better. Consciousness is what a nervous
system does and cannot be separated from its material basis, such as
software cannot be seen aside its medium or hardware. One just doesn't
exist
without the other. If we understand the laws that are governing the
nervous
system, we can understand how consciousness works. Consciousness is an
aspect on (physical) existence, and not apart from it as one would think
when hearing the Objectivist axioms.


----------------
> According to Branden theism, self-transcendence, mysticism and
selflessness.

A:  None of those things are INHERENT in spirituality, and I think you
must
have misinterpreted Branden if you think he said so.  We may have a
language
problem here:  "inherent," according to my dictionary, means "involved in
the constitution or essential character of something."  The things that
you
list are not essential to spirituality; they are not part of what is
necessary to constitute spirituality.  They are, of course, traditionally
associated with spirituality, but Objectivism isn't a traditionalist
philosophy.

>> You are right, it isn't inherent in spirituality, but they are rejected
both by Objectivism and science -- and I think they can be on a
psychological level very valuable. This is something Objectivism can't
offer
until now (and maybe never will). See how much people are attracted by
these
traditional forms of spirituality in contrast to Objectivism.


----------------
>> I am most curious to see your ideas as to what specific rituals might
be
incorporated into spirituality as practiced by Objectivists, and how they
might support an Objectivist sense of life.

> That's the problem. In my opinion, it wouldn't support an Objectivist
sense of life. Rather it would give the people something higher then
themselves that they can admire and trust.

A:  If you'll look back at my earlier e-mail, you'll see that my curiosity
arose from your statement that "what Objectivism can and should do is in
my
opinion, to create and practice rituals similar those which can be found
in
Christianity."  So are you suggesting that Objectivism ought to promote a
kind of spirituality that, by your own admission, would fail to support an
Objectivist sense of life?

>> Well, I am very cautious to suggest anything concrete at this point,
but
the Objectivist sense of life is only of secondary concern to me. I'm more
interested in the effects such changes in belief would have on factual
life
contentment and happiness.


A:  In any case, your suggestion would not really "give the people
something
higher then themselves that they can admire and trust."  At best, it would
give them the false illusion of such a thing. But what is worse is that it
would leave them with the deep, desperately-to-be-evaded knowledge that
they
had failed to follow a standard of reason consistently and therefore could
no longer trust the conclusions of their own consciousness.

>> Yes, this of course is a weak point. It definitively diminishes "mind
esteem". But on the other hand, faithful people can have so much trust in
something that they perceive to be good that they are blissful. I know,
now
you'd object that these feeling must be irrational or nonobjective and
therefore of no value. But is it really so?


----------------
A:  More typically, though, the lives of criminals and tyrants are short
and
brutal, filled with (well-justified) paranoia, and often terminating with
grisly deaths.  If I remember correctly, Stalin died because he could not
trust his own doctors (I've forgotten the details.)  And what happened to
Hitler, to Mussolini, and to Louis XVI?  (Cf.
http://www.mindspring.com/~cunningr/pp/cf/HI20067.html ff.)  Of
course, a
particular criminal or tyrant might beat the odds, thus remaining what you
call "successful."  But any such individual plays a very risky game; if he
is truly "happy," as you suggest, then that is because he is blissfully
ignorant of the danger around the corner.  The smarter criminal or tyrant
lives in constant fearful watch, lest he be betrayed by his companion
thugs.
And the smartest criminal or tyrant--well, if he's that smart, he doesn't
become a criminal or a tyrant in the first place.  Yes, practicing the
non-initiation-of-force principle is indeed essential to one's true
self-interest.  Persuading people of this fact of nature, on the other
hand,
is a non-trivial task.

>> Okay, on an individual level I see that, but how about situations where
the violation is supported by a larger group? Coercion is widely
institutionalized and it seems to work pretty well. Wouldn't be it, for
example, in the best interest of a handicapped person to advocate social
welfare for his particular interest group?

Alexander
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Rob, 8/29/03:

> Not that it [Objectivism] rejects such primacy explicitly, but that it ignores the (empirical) sciences by, for example, rejecting materialism/determinism and evolutionary psychology. At least this is true for the orthodoxy.

A:  In an earlier e-mail, you complained that Objectivism and the sciences were somehow aligned together against "spirituality" by dint of their supposedly common materialism/determinism.  Here, however, you are arguing the opposite:  that Objectivism is incompatible with the sciences because it is not materialistic and deterministic.  I am not sure which is your real viewpoint, but I disagree with both of them.

In the first place, today even most empirical scientists no longer adhere strictly to materialist or deterministic views.  The majority of modern physicists, for instance, now endorse a perspective derived from quantum mechanics, arguing that at the micro level even the physical world is indeterministic and can be predicted only in terms of probabilities.  Regardless of whether or not one agrees with that interpretation, it is not true at all that all physicists are determinists or that Objectivism is therefore incompatible with physics.

Now physics by definition is concerned with physical reality and might therefore be described as "materialistic."  But that is only because its purview is limited to one part of reality--the material part.  In contrast, the science of psychology is by definition concerned with mind and must therefore be non-materialistic.  Or do you not consider psychology to be a valid empirical science?

And while the orthodoxy at ARI might be uncomfortable with evolutionary psychology, the topic is quite popular among other Objectivists, as I have already pointed out.  As I suggested in an earlier note, if you wish to incorporate some ideas from the field into your understanding of Objectivism, you should feel free to go ahead and do so.

As I see it, Objectivism is neither materialistic nor deterministic, but neither is valid science, at least not in general.
-------------
> Yes, normally this is the case. But you shouldn't dismiss at the same time that especially strong emotions are powerful filters through which we perceive reality on a higher, conceptual level. The first-level percepts are not the problem. Almost everyone can agree on their objectivity.

A:  You are right that human beings tend to filter their conceptual understanding through their emotions.  That's one of the most compelling reasons why we--and in particular, scientists--need an Objectivist epistemology in order to ensure that our concepts are constructed in an objective manner.
-------------
> Consider that the biologically rational code of ethics is machiavellian in nature...

A:  What does "biologically rational" mean?  For human beings in general, the Machiavellian approach does not serve one's self-interest very well.  At best, it may have some application in statist societies such as the one in which Machiavelli lived.  But it doesn't provide a valid basis for a general, rational code of ethics.  In general, the world is simply too complicated to calculate the effects of our actions in such a cynical manner; such calculated behavior has a way of backfiring on us.  Reality as a whole is more complex than a chessboard; and even in chess, optimum play requires more than just calculating tactics.

> ...that the survival of our gene is more important then our own survival on the individual level...

A:  More important to whom?  Personally, I don't have any offspring, and my own life, as well as the survival of my ideas, is much more important to me than the survival of my genes.

> ...that individualism is not as strong as tribalism/nepotism...

A:  In some places, tribalism and nepotism are indeed now stronger than individualism.  Remember, however, that ethics is concerned, not primarily with how human beings act at present, but with how human beings ought to act in order to maximize their lives.
-------------
> But if one of the institutes will follow this advice [to incorporate ideas from evolutionary psychology into Objectivist thought], it surely won't be the ARI. And who knows how long ~that~ will take. I need something to work with now.

A:  You're an intelligent, educated person.  It sounds like a good project for you.  Please, however, make sure you understand Objectivist epistemology first.
-------------
> But doesn't then doubt and certainty neutralize each other so that it would be misleading to state that they coexist? Doesn't doubt, even on one level, makes certainty impossible? (Maybe I am sidetracked by this issue.)

A:  I think you're assuming, in effect, that people always think perfectly rationally.  Although contradictions do not exist in reality, people can and do harbor contradictions in their minds.  Because they are fallible, they can believe A at one level and non-A at another.  Ideally, over time they resolve most of these contradictions in such a way as to bring their beliefs in accordance with reality, where A and non-A are incompatible.
-------------
> As you are talking of childhood experiences -- and I'm sorry if I interrupt the flow of your thinking here -- do you believe psychodynamic processes as laid out by Sigmund Freud are possible? (Objectivists normally don't think they are, I tend to believe that psychodynamic processes are in principle possible and worth identifying.)

A:  I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "psychodynamic processes," but I do agree that complex mechanisms (e. g., psychological projection) may operate on a subconscious level.  That is not to say that I accept the details of Freud's account, however.
-------------
> This assumption [of a need for faith] leads to a number of problems.  First, how can beliefs that are not derived from reality facilitate our interaction with that reality?  And how can beliefs that don't help us to interact with reality better make our lives better?

>> Through a sense of calmness and trust that the world is just?

A:  But the feeling you describe doesn't require faith.  I believe that the same feeling can be achieved through rational thought.  Furthermore, if you did not arrive at it through rational thought, but rather through some leap of faith, you would have to know, at some deep level in your being, that your supposed "sense of calmness" was not really rational or justifiable.  You would know that you believed something about reality that did not come from reality.  In short, you would be harboring a contradiction, in the sense I alluded to above, and that in itself would make a true sense of calmness and trust impossible to realize!
-------------
> And to determine what are beneficial faith-based beliefs we could investigate into what religions are doing traditionally. Do you think all religious beliefs contradict scientific knowledge? There may be some which don't, but, again, I'm not sure.

A:  The point is that your question requires a scientific investigation, not a religious one.  That is, in order to determine which faith-based beliefs are beneficial and therefore which ones you will adopt, you would have to examine whether or not they contradict valid scientific knowledge.  But if you approach it that way, then the beliefs you eventually adopt are based on scientific knowledge, not on faith!
-------------
> Consciousness is what a nervous system does and cannot be separated from its material basis, such as software cannot be seen aside its medium or hardware. One just doesn't exist
without the other. If we understand the laws that are governing the nervous system, we can understand how consciousness works. Consciousness is an aspect on (physical) existence, and not apart from it as one would think when hearing the Objectivist axioms.

A:  Actually, when we deal with software, we no longer think about the and-gates, or-gates, and not-gates that underlie it in the hardware.  Programmers back in the early 1950s might have thought in such terms.  But today, only old-fashioned programmers like myself even know about such things anymore.  Nowadays we need software concepts--like instructions, procedures, parameters, objects, and properties--in order to understand modern software.  In the same way, in order to understand how the human mind works, we need to think in terms of concepts of consciousness, involving such matters as ideas, logic, emotions, values, and desires.

If you're proposing that we develop a complete explanation of an individual's thought based purely on physical conditions of the nervous system, I think you grossly underestimate the complexity of your task.  I think any expert in the field would regard the project as utopian.  For all practical purposes, if we want to follow the operations of consciousness, we need to understand it on its own terms.  Admittedly, in order to understand the thought processes of a given individual, we may need to factor in physical influences like hormones and brain chemistry.  But conceptually we cannot reduce all of consciousness to such factors.  In any case, if consciousness were merely a matter of physics, then spirituality would be out of the question; therefore, if you want to introduce a stronger spirituality into your life, I don't see why you would want to look at your consciousness that way.

On the other hand, Objectivism does not claim that consciousness is totally separate from existence.  Rather, it is always an attribute of an existent; that is, there cannot be consciousness unless some conscious entity exists.
------------
> But on the other hand, faithful people can have so much trust in something that they perceive to be good that they are blissful. I know, now you'd object that these feeling must be irrational or nonobjective and therefore of no value. But is it really so?

A:  I wonder:  Are they really that blissful, or are they desperately trying to convince themselves that they are happy?  And if so, why do so many of them find it imperative to convert others to their way of thinking?

As I have already suggested, those who believe on faith are harboring a kind of internal contradiction, which prevents them from realizing full psychological integration.  Can a person so divided within himself be happy?  Perhaps, I think, he could realize some superficial sense of happiness if he was less than fully self-aware.  In other words, it takes at least a partial suspension of mental focus (which, by the way, is why faith and Objectivism are incompatible).

Now I'm not claiming that faith is always a devastating flaw in personality.  As you perhaps remember, my best friend here in the U.S. regards himself as a Catholic.  (This matter, by the way, is not something that he and I can profitably debate, since his faith is fundamentally incompatible with logic.)  And while I can see some negative effects that this belief has had on his life and on his mind, I am also aware that there remain healthy, positive aspects in his personality.  Otherwise, we would certainly not remain close.
------------
> Okay, on an individual level I see that, but how about situations where the violation is supported by a larger group? Coercion is widely institutionalized and it seems to work pretty well. Wouldn't be it, for example, in the best interest of a handicapped person to advocate social welfare for his particular interest group?

A:  I know that it looks that way on the surface, and it would be likely to look that way for a handicapped person who had not gone through the Human Action course or a similar learning experience.  But most importantly of all, a handicapped person has a strong vested interest in freedom, just as you and I do.  And every coercive measure that he or she advocates pushes the complex engine of society further toward interventionism and away from freedom.  Since I have already argued the point at length in the course, I won't elaborate any more on it here.

Rob
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Alexander, 9/5/03:

A: In an earlier e-mail, you complained that Objectivism and the sciences
were somehow aligned together against "spirituality" by dint of their
supposedly common materialism/determinism.  Here, however, you are arguing
the opposite:  that Objectivism is incompatible with the sciences because
it
is not materialistic and deterministic.  I am not sure which is your real
viewpoint, but I disagree with both of them.

>> Sorry, I haven't distinguished clearly between the Objectivist
orthodoxy
and a logically consistent Objectivism as I see it. And yes, I see the
latter, together with a scientific worldview opposed to (traditional forms
of) spirituality.


A: In the first place, today even most empirical scientists no longer
adhere
strictly to materialist or deterministic views.  The majority of modern
physicists, for instance, now endorse a perspective derived from quantum
mechanics, arguing that at the micro level even the physical world is
indeterministic and can be predicted only in terms of probabilities.
Regardless of whether or not one agrees with that interpretation, it is
not
true at all that all physicists are determinists or that Objectivism is
therefore incompatible with physics.

>> I don't see any relevancy of allegedly indeterministic phenomena on the
subatomar level for beings living in basically Newtonian universe and
their
nervous systems being composed of perfectly deterministic elements. While
I
have no education in physics, my conviction is that physicists are at the
micro level in reality confronted with epistemological problems and not
with
some sort of freaky ontology. That physicists who see it that way, as the
adherents of the Aristotelian interpretation of quantum mechanics, are in
the minority, says, as we have often seen in history, nothing about the
validity of the theory in question. Most Objectivists defend, rightfully
in
my eyes, the classical, deterministic interpretation. It's only that they
curiously fail to apply their insights on their view of "free" will.


A: Now physics by definition is concerned with physical reality and might
therefore be described as "materialistic."  But that is only because its
purview is limited to one part of reality--the material part.  In
contrast,
the science of psychology is by definition concerned with mind and must
therefore be non-materialistic.  Or do you not consider psychology to be a
valid empirical science?

>> That depends whether its research is based mainly on insight or on
empirical experiments (as in social psychology and psychiatry). There's
still enough religion in psychology (90%) to speak of it as a valid
science -- as in all of humanities. When you say that the mind is
"non-materialistic" you are misinterpreting its true nature -- specific
motions and states of a nervous system. The mind is what the brain does,
it
is a process, a epiphenomenona of matter.


A: And while the orthodoxy at ARI might be uncomfortable with evolutionary
psychology, the topic is quite popular among other Objectivists, as I have
already pointed out.  As I suggested in an earlier note, if you wish to
incorporate some ideas from the field into your understanding of
Objectivism, you should feel free to go ahead and do so.

>> That's a major task which needs cooperation with evolutionary
psychologists with sympathy for Objectivism and would require a lot of
time.
Currently I need a product I can make money of. Research, if I am capable
of
it at all, comes later. We don't even have the books that Objectivists in
the US have.


A: As I see it, Objectivism is neither materialistic nor deterministic,
but
neither is valid science, at least not in general.

>> I strongly disagree. Naturalism, which for me implies hard determinism
and "materialism", is the only valid view. Everything beyond it is
religion/spirituality.
-------------
A:  You are right that human beings tend to filter their conceptual
understanding through their emotions.  That's one of the most compelling
reasons why we--and in particular, scientists--need an Objectivist
epistemology in order to ensure that our concepts are constructed in an
objective manner.

>> Yes, language, or most important thinking tool, can and must be
scientifically constructed.
-------------
A:  What does "biologically rational" mean?

>> Maximizing the amount of our own grandchildren while ideologically
minimizing the amount of grandchildren enemy tribes/nations produce.
Genetic, ideological, economic and military expansionism.


A: For human beings in general, the Machiavellian approach does not serve
one's self-interest very well.  At best, it may have some application in
statist societies such as the one in which Machiavelli lived.  But it
doesn't provide a valid basis for a general, rational code of ethics.  In
general, the world is simply too complicated to calculate the effects of
our
actions in such a cynical manner; such calculated behavior has a way of
backfiring on us.  Reality as a whole is more complex than a chessboard;
and
even in chess, optimum play requires more than just calculating tactics.

>> You are just saying that one needs to think on a higher then a merely
tactical level. You can take machiavellianism without problems to
strategic
heights when you correctly identify the game that is to play (see above).


A:  More important to whom?  Personally, I don't have any offspring, and
my
own life, as well as the survival of my ideas, is much more important to
me
than the survival of my genes.

>> So biologically you are a dead end. I plan my offspring, and people
like
you are leaving the place for people like me.


A:  In some places, tribalism and nepotism are indeed now stronger than
individualism.  Remember, however, that ethics is concerned, not primarily
with how human beings act at present, but with how human beings ought to
act
in order to maximize their lives.

>> And the lives of their grandchildren. That integrates it all.
-------------
A:  You're an intelligent, educated person.  It sounds like a good project
for you.  Please, however, make sure you understand Objectivist
epistemology
first.

>> I have a probably degenerative illness, so I don't believe that what is
left of my intelligence (alone) will suffice.
-------------
A:  I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "psychodynamic processes," but I
do agree that complex mechanisms (e. g., psychological projection) may
operate on a subconscious level.  That is not to say that I accept the
details of Freud's account, however.

>> Yes, "psychodynamic" in the sense that complex cognition can take place
on the subconscious level. Defense mechanisms are a part of it.
-------------
A:  But the feeling you describe doesn't require faith.  I believe that
the
same feeling can be achieved through rational thought.  Furthermore, if
you
did not arrive at it through rational thought, but rather through some
leap
of faith, you would have to know, at some deep level in your being, that
your supposed "sense of calmness" was not really rational or justifiable.
You would know that you believed something about reality that did not come
from reality.  In short, you would be harboring a contradiction, in the
sense I alluded to above, and that in itself would make a true sense of
calmness and trust impossible to realize!

>> You are probably right. At the time you know a belief is based on faith
and not on evidence it looses conviction.
-------------
A:  The point is that your question requires a scientific investigation,
not
a religious one.  That is, in order to determine which faith-based beliefs
are beneficial and therefore which ones you will adopt, you would have to
examine whether or not they contradict valid scientific knowledge.  But if
you approach it that way, then the beliefs you eventually adopt are based
on
scientific knowledge, not on faith!

>> Yes. There is much to do for a objective science of psychology.
-------------
A:  Actually, when we deal with software, we no longer think about the
and-gates, or-gates, and not-gates that underlie it in the hardware.
Programmers back in the early 1950s might have thought in such terms.  But
today, only old-fashioned programmers like myself even know about such
things anymore.  Nowadays we need software concepts--like instructions,
procedures, parameters, objects, and properties--in order to understand
modern software.  In the same way, in order to understand how the human
mind
works, we need to think in terms of concepts of consciousness, involving
such matters as ideas, logic, emotions, values, and desires.

>> I have much to learn. Up until now I was mainly interested in the
psychology of persuasion. Perhaps one day, when I have more money and a
business up and running, my primary interests will shift towards these
issues.


A: If you're proposing that we develop a complete explanation of an
individual's thought based purely on physical conditions of the nervous
system, I think you grossly underestimate the complexity of your task.  I
think any expert in the field would regard the project as utopian.  For
all
practical purposes, if we want to follow the operations of consciousness,
we
need to understand it on its own terms.  Admittedly, in order to
understand
the thought processes of a given individual, we may need to factor in
physical influences like hormones and brain chemistry.  But conceptually
we
cannot reduce all of consciousness to such factors.  In any case, if
consciousness were merely a matter of physics, then spirituality would be
out of the question; therefore, if you want to introduce a stronger
spirituality into your life, I don't see why you would want to look at
your
consciousness that way.

>> I cannot not do it. I almost compulsory think that I'm a neural
network.
That's perhaps the reason I oftentimes feel somehow not real and detached.


A: On the other hand, Objectivism does not claim that consciousness is
totally separate from existence.  Rather, it is always an attribute of an
existent; that is, there cannot be consciousness unless some conscious
entity exists.

>> Exactly. And this entity must have identity according to our ontology.

------------
A:  I wonder:  Are they really that blissful, or are they desperately
trying
to convince themselves that they are happy?  And if so, why do so many of
them find it imperative to convert others to their way of thinking?

>> Every psychologically healthy and expanding individual will seek out
confirmation for his beliefs. I would worry more about the people who
doesn'
t seem to be concerned at all what others think and do.


A: As I have already suggested, those who believe on faith are harboring a
kind of internal contradiction, which prevents them from realizing full
psychological integration.  Can a person so divided within himself be
happy?
Perhaps, I think, he could realize some superficial sense of happiness if
he
was less than fully self-aware.  In other words, it takes at least a
partial
suspension of mental focus (which, by the way, is why faith and
Objectivism
are incompatible).

>> They are not aware that what they believe is based on faith. That's the
trick.
------------
A:  I know that it looks that way on the surface, and it would be likely
to
look that way for a handicapped person who had not gone through the Human
Action course or a similar learning experience.  But most importantly of
all, a handicapped person has a strong vested interest in freedom, just as
you and I do.  And every coercive measure that he or she advocates pushes
the complex engine of society further toward interventionism and away from
freedom.  Since I have already argued the point at length in the course, I
won't elaborate any more on it here.

>> In principle, I do have a strong interest in freedom for all, but my
situation might require it that I utilize the given laws and apply for
social welfare. What does the course say about that?

Alexander
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Rob, 9/12/03:

> I don't see any relevancy of allegedly indeterministic phenomena on the subatomar level for beings living in basically Newtonian universe and their nervous systems being composed of perfectly deterministic elements. While I have no education in physics, my conviction is that physicists are at the micro level in reality confronted with epistemological problems and not
with some sort of freaky ontology. That physicists who see it that way, as the adherents of the Aristotelian interpretation of quantum mechanics, are in the minority, says, as we have often seen in history, nothing about the validity of the theory in question. Most Objectivists defend, rightfully in my eyes, the classical, deterministic interpretation. It's only that they
curiously fail to apply their insights on their view of "free" will.

A:  Regardless of whether unpredictability at the subatomic level arises for epistemological or metaphysical reasons, it presents what seems to me an insuperable obstacle to any attempt to predict outcomes in human behavior based on the working out of physical laws--if that's what you had in mind.  The obstacle arises from the fact that micro and macro phenomena are not neatly separated.  The position of an electron can only be described in probabilistic terms--and furthermore, according to quantum physicists, the same is true of the position of a larger object such as a rubber ball, even if the probability distribution has a much smaller standard deviation in the latter case.  Like the rubber ball, our neural systems are ultimately composed of much smaller particles, and consequently their physical behavior can only be described in probabilistic terms.

But if we discard the idea that human behavior can be predicted precisely, it is not at all clear what else "determinism" might even mean.  (You may have forgotten, but I visited the issue briefly, in four pages, beginning at http://www.humanactioncourse.info/pp/cc/HF40012a.html.  I kept the discussion of this very complex issue brief in order to avoid getting the reader sidetracked.)  In any case, the notion that human beings make choices (volition, otherwise known as "free will") does not require any kind of "freaky" ontology or metaphysics.  The Objectivist view of the matter, as I explain in the course, assumes only that actions are caused ("determined," if you prefer) by entities (rather than by previous actions), and that consequently those actions must be consistent with the nature of the acting entities.  A human being cannot act in a manner contrary to his nature, but that does not mean that he never makes choices.  And as a practical matter, we can best understand human choices by using concepts of consciousness, rather than concepts drawn from physics--just as we can best understand the operations of modern software using advanced software concepts, rather than by analyzing the underlying and-gates and or-gates.
-----------------
> When you say that the mind is "non-materialistic" you are misinterpreting its true nature -- specific motions and states of a nervous system. The mind is what the brain does, it is a process, a epiphenomenona of matter.

A:  My dictionary defines epiphenomenon as "a secondary phenomenon accompanying another and caused by it."  As I stated before, I see actions as caused by the acting entities.  To be precise, consciousness is not caused by matter in general.  On the other hand, it is true, in one sense of the word "brain," that a particular individual's consciousness is caused by his brain (i. e., it is an epiphenomenon of his brain).  But if you want to use this fact to understand a person's thought processes and behavior, I think you have to look at the brain as more than a mere collection of neurons--and I believe informed neurological scientists would agree with me here.

Of course, if consciousness could be understood simply by analyzing the operations of neurons, then spirituality would be a sham.  Since this discussion began with your quest for deeper spirituality, I am therefore mystified why you would want to take this kind of view of consciousness.
-----------------
> Naturalism, which for me implies hard determinism and "materialism", is the only valid view. Everything beyond it is religion/spirituality.

A:  Once again, if reality, as you imply, really was entirely materialistic and deterministic, then there would be no mind, no spirit, no place for either spirituality or religion.
-----------------
>>...ethics is concerned, not primarily with how human beings act at present, but with how human beings ought to act in order to maximize their lives.

> And the lives of their grandchildren. That integrates it all.

A:  You miss my point entirely.  Even if it were true, as you seem to think, that we are biologically driven to preserve our grandchildren, that would only explain how human beings act at present and would have little to do with ethics.  In fact, if our actions were indeed mechanistically determined by biological drives, then there would be no need for ethics at all--since the function of ethics is to guide our choices, and if our actions are mechanistically determined, we do not really make choices.

Furthermore, if insuring the procreation and preservation of grandchildren were the highest ethical standard, then I guess that Ayn Rand (who left no offspring) and I would have to be classified as utterly evil people!
----------------
> I almost compulsory think that I'm a neural network.  That's perhaps the reason I oftentimes feel somehow not real and detached.

A:  I don't know where you got that view of yourself, but I imagine it would be spiritually devastating.  I am reminded of a friend with whom I was once close.  I first met him in 1966, when we were both in college. He was then a bright, energetic, intellectually active youth.  In fact, it was he who first introduced me to the ideas of Ayn Rand and Objectivism.  About fifteen years later, however, he acquired the notion that our thoughts and actions are determined by some combination of genetics and environment, and that our faculty of choice is an illusion.  He could not defend the idea intellectually, but nevertheless clung to it--I suspect in order to justify to himself not making some uncomfortable choices in his life.  In any case, he has deteriorated steadily since that time.  First, he ceased to take care of himself physically, failing not only to take care of proper nutrition and exercise but even basic hygiene.  After being diagnosed with fibromyalgia, he resigned himself to the idea that he would henceforth only continue to deteriorate physically.  (In contrast, I have another friend with the same diagnosis who has preserved a very positive attitude and who remains amazingly active and healthy.)  Meanwhile, he succumbed to foolish spending habits, running himself into major debt and eventually losing his house to foreclosure.  He shut himself from new developments in his career field, leading to the loss of his job.  Eventually, he turned away from Objectivism entirely, converting to the Eastern Orthodox faith (!).  He now lives off the sympathy of others, together with government disability.  Although I still meet with him about once a year (for old times' sake), it is very painful to see him in his present pitiable state.

I earnestly hope that you will rcognize that you are in fact the master of your own fate.  While some matters may be beyond your control, you have far more choice than you think you do.  I suspect you also have far more choice about your life than your doctors think:  physicians seem occupationally disposed to be aware only of their patients' physical status, and they therefore tend to underestimate the effects of attitude and lifestyle choices on the progression of illness.
-----------------
>> Are they [faithful people] really that blissful, or are they desperately trying to convince themselves that they are happy?  And if so, why do so many of them find it imperative to convert others to their way of thinking?

> Every psychologically healthy and expanding individual will seek out confirmation for his beliefs.

A:  And in seeking out confirmation for their beliefs, rational people don't ask for an opinion poll:  they go directly to reality.  This was a cardinal point in my course; see for instance, pp. 1.3:56-62 (starting at http://www.humanactioncourse.info/pp/cc/HF30056.html).
-----------------
> In principle, I do have a strong interest in freedom for all, but my situation might require it that I utilize the given laws and apply for social welfare. What does the course say about that?

A:  I touch on the issue, at least implicitly, near the very end of the course, in my discussion of the notion of "retreatism."  On page 5.6:6 (http://www.humanactioncourse.info/pp/cg/HI60006.html), I point out that "today's society ... has become so saturated with statism that human beings must associate with the state in certain ways in order to attain an acceptable standard of living."  As a consequence, I note, to "follow retreatism consistently" would require forsaking many of the basic benefits of living in society, which would be "a kind of self-sacrifice conflicting with the basic moral principles developed in this course. In other words, retreatists do not really preserve their moral integrity, because their approach tries to apply a single political principle while ignoring its larger ethical perspective."

More specifically, the various regulatory and confiscatory policies of the state disrupt the economy to such a degree that many people may find that they have little choice but to turn to its social welfare programs--programs which, in many cases, they have financed with their own past tax dollars anyway.  So certainly some ethical argument can be made in favor of utilizing those programs in certain specific cases.  At the same time, a rational, moral person continues to advocate the suspension of such programs, along with the termination of all the other interventionist measures that cripple our lives.  Furthermore, he does whatever he can to end his dependency on those programs.  By the way, I don't think the American economy is socialized to quite the same degree as Germany's; have you ever thought about coming here?

Ethically, this issue is obviously very tricky.  But as I show in Section V of the course, it is characteristic of statist societies that they force such ethical dilemmas upon the individual, thereby encouraging all kinds of hypocrisy and dishonesty.  Statist societies discourage people to act virtuously, whereas free societies naturally encourage them to discover and practice the virtues.

Rob
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Alexander, 09/15/03:

A:  Regardless of whether unpredictability at the subatomic level arises for
epistemological or metaphysical reasons, it presents what seems to me an
insuperable obstacle to any attempt to predict outcomes in human behavior
based on the working out of physical laws--if that's what you had in mind.

>> No, that's not what I had in mind. Of course complex human behavior
cannot be predicted on the basis of physical laws, but it can be predicted
in principle (!), as the behavior of lower life forms can be predicted.
There are a lot of sciences dealing with the prediction and control of human
behavior: biology, medicine, psychiatry, psychology, ethics, politics...


A: The obstacle arises from the fact that micro and macro phenomena are not
neatly separated.  The position of an electron can only be described in
probabilistic terms--and furthermore, according to quantum physicists, the
same is true of the position of a larger object such as a rubber ball, even
if the probability distribution has a much smaller standard deviation in the
latter case.  Like the rubber ball, our neural systems are ultimately
composed of much smaller particles, and consequently their physical behavior
can only be described in probabilistic terms.

>> From my understanding, micro and macro phenomena can be separated, since
the principles governing the micro level seem to find their dividing line
(horizon) at a certain microscopic level where they ~don't~ translate into
macro phenomena which they are a part of. That the position of a electron,
for example, can only be predicted in probabilistic terms, doesn't mean that
it is governed by the same "laws" as they can be observed in quantum
mechanics. It's just a epistemological problem, not a metaphysical one. If I
'm not totally misinformed, the Newtonian laws are here in place as
everywhere else in our directly experienced environment. You err with the
comparison of the neural system with a rubber ball too. What single neurons
are doing is perfectly predictable, the problem is just their amount and the
complexity of the network.


A: But if we discard the idea that human behavior can be predicted
precisely, it is not at all clear what else "determinism" might even mean.
(You may have forgotten, but I visited the issue briefly, in four pages,
beginning at http://www.humanactioncourse.info/pp/cc/HF40012a.html.  I kept
the discussion of this very complex issue brief in order to avoid getting
the reader sidetracked.)

>> I never said that human behavior can be predicted "precisely",
I said
only "in principle."


A: In any case, the notion that human beings make choices (volition,
otherwise known as "free will") does not require any kind of "freaky"
ontology or metaphysics.  The Objectivist view of the matter, as I explain
in the course, assumes only that actions are caused ("determined," if
you
prefer) by entities (rather than by previous actions), and that consequently
those actions must be consistent with the nature of the acting entities.

>> How can a entity "cause" something without a action??? It is
the same if
you say that a action is caused by another entity or by another action.


A: A human being cannot act in a manner contrary to his nature, but that
does not mean that he never makes choices.

>> Who says that humans don't make choices? Do you think determinists are
claiming that? Then again you err. Of course human beings make choices, but
they don't differ in principle from the "choices" a software makes when
going through a "if-then"-routine.


A: And as a practical matter, we can best understand human choices by using
concepts of consciousness, rather than concepts drawn from physics--just as
we can best understand the operations of modern software using advanced
software concepts, rather than by analyzing the underlying and-gates and
or-gates.

>>I agree, but that doesn't invalidate determinism as an ontological fact.
BTW -- you already mentioned them before -- what are "or- and and-gates"?
-----------------
A:  My dictionary defines epiphenomenon as "a secondary phenomenon
accompanying another and caused by it."  As I stated before, I see actions
as caused by the acting entities.  To be precise, consciousness is not
caused by matter in general.

>> That depends on what you define consciousness to be. There was a time
when I considered the falling of a stone as a primitive form of
consciousness.


A: On the other hand, it is true, in one sense of the word "brain," that
a
particular individual's consciousness is caused by his brain (i. e., it is
an epiphenomenon of his brain).

>> Sure, that's what we are talking about.


A: But if you want to use this fact to understand a person's thought
processes and behavior, I think you have to look at the brain as more than a
mere collection of neurons--and I believe informed neurological scientists
would agree with me here.

Of course, if consciousness could be understood simply by analyzing the
operations of neurons, then spirituality would be a sham.  Since this
discussion began with your quest for deeper spirituality, I am therefore
mystified why you would want to take this kind of view of consciousness.

>> I cannot adopt a specific view of reality based merely on the
consequences which it is associated. My wishes for more spirituality
notwithstanding, I am aware of the conflicts of science and it.
-----------------
A:  Once again, if reality, as you imply, really was entirely materialistic
and deterministic, then there would be no mind, no spirit, no place for
either spirituality or religion.

>> ... as it is commonly understood, sure. But you can adopt the scientific
perspective of these phenomena and explain it in such terms, mind/spirit
being what a nervous system does, spirituality/religion being certain
psychological practices which relieve one's live. So all that can be
preserved in a rational philosophy.
-----------------
>>...ethics is concerned, not primarily with how human beings act at
present, but with how human beings ought to act in order to maximize their
lives.

> And the lives of their grandchildren. That integrates it all.

A:  You miss my point entirely.  Even if it were true, as you seem to think,
that we are biologically driven to preserve our grandchildren, that would
only explain how human beings act at present and would have little to do
with ethics.  In fact, if our actions were indeed mechanistically determined
by biological drives, then there would be no need for ethics at all--since
the function of ethics is to guide our choices, and if our actions are
mechanistically determined, we do not really make choices.

>> That's not true. First, "drives" are values, and ethics, as we
have
learned, deals with values. They can be rational or irrational, and the more
derived they are, the greater is the risk that they are irrational. Second,
that our choices are in the background all "mechanistically" determined,
is
for our day-to-day practice of living irrelevant. Our very consciousness is
the expression of "complex mechanics" and that doesn't change anything
about
its usefulness or instrumentality. We should exercise it to prevent more
primitive areas of our brain to make false decisions. That all of our
choices, like every phenomenon in existence, are determined, says nothing
about their functionality. Determined processes can be functional or
dysfunctional. Ethics, as a science, is needed by complex being like humans.


A: Furthermore, if insuring the procreation and preservation of
grandchildren were the highest ethical standard, then I guess that Ayn Rand
(who left no offspring) and I would have to be classified as utterly evil
people!

>> You can be evil for someone only if you initiate force or fraud against
him/her. When you are sabotaging your own happiness you are only irrational,
not evil. Seen from a higher perspective, that of a nation for example, you
could be seen as >irresponsible< at best.
----------------
A:  I don't know where you got that view of yourself, but I imagine it would
be spiritually devastating.  I am reminded of a friend with whom I was once
close.  I first met him in 1966, when we were both in college. He was then a
bright, energetic, intellectually active youth.  In fact, it was he who
first introduced me to the ideas of Ayn Rand and Objectivism.  About fifteen
years later, however, he acquired the notion that our thoughts and actions
are determined by some combination of genetics and environment, and that our
faculty of choice is an illusion.  He could not defend the idea
intellectually, but nevertheless clung to it--I suspect in order to justify
to himself not making some uncomfortable choices in his life.  In any case,
he has deteriorated steadily since that time.  First, he ceased to take care
of himself physically, failing not only to take care of proper nutrition and
exercise but even basic hygiene.  After being diagnosed with fibromyalgia,
he resigned himself to the idea that he would henceforth only continue to
deteriorate physically.  (In contrast, I have another friend with the same
diagnosis who has preserved a very positive attitude and who remains
amazingly active and healthy.)  Meanwhile, he succumbed to foolish spending
habits, running himself into major debt and eventually losing his house to
foreclosure.  He shut himself from new developments in his career field,
leading to the loss of his job.  Eventually, he turned away from Objectivism
entirely, converting to the Eastern Orthodox faith (!).  He now lives off
the sympathy of others, together with government disability.  Although I
still meet with him about once a year (for old times' sake), it is very
painful to see him in his present pitiable state.

>> Your story made me curious: Where on his path exactly do you think he
made a critical error? Is it more that he resorted to fatalism/defeatism
(which is not the same as determinism), or that he couldn't defend his
ontological viewpoints intellectually?


A: I earnestly hope that you will rcognize that you are in fact the master
of your own fate.  While some matters may be beyond your control, you have
far more choice than you think you do.  I suspect you also have far more
choice about your life than your doctors think:  physicians seem
occupationally disposed to be aware only of their patients' physical status,
and they therefore tend to underestimate the effects of attitude and
lifestyle choices on the progression of illness.

>> But I also have to confront reality. My wishes won't change it. And my
lifestyle choices are limited.
-----------------
A:  And in seeking out confirmation for their beliefs, rational people don't
ask for an opinion poll:  they go directly to reality.  This was a cardinal
point in my course; see for instance, pp. 1.3:56-62 (starting at
http://www.humanactioncourse.info/pp/cc/HF30056.html).

>> You'll probably accusing me of social metaphysics, but other people are
a
part of reality, and we must deal with them, taking their views in account.
I think it is a psychologically normal and healthy impulse to seek a social
environment where values are shared or, if one cannot find such, creating
it.
-----------------
A:  I touch on the issue, at least implicitly, near the very end of the
course, in my discussion of the notion of "retreatism."  On page 5.6:6
(http://www.humanactioncourse.info/pp/cg/HI60006.html), I point out that
"today's society ... has become so saturated with statism that human beings
must associate with the state in certain ways in order to attain an
acceptable standard of living."  As a consequence, I note, to "follow
retreatism consistently" would require forsaking many of the basic benefits
of living in society, which would be "a kind of self-sacrifice conflicting
with the basic moral principles developed in this course. In other words,
retreatists do not really preserve their moral integrity, because their
approach tries to apply a single political principle while ignoring its
larger ethical perspective."

More specifically, the various regulatory and confiscatory policies of the
state disrupt the economy to such a degree that many people may find that
they have little choice but to turn to its social welfare programs--programs
which, in many cases, they have financed with their own past tax dollars
anyway.  So certainly some ethical argument can be made in favor of
utilizing those programs in certain specific cases.  At the same time, a
rational, moral person continues to advocate the suspension of such
programs, along with the termination of all the other interventionist
measures that cripple our lives.  Furthermore, he does whatever he can to
end his dependency on those programs.

>> I totally agree with you. Although it would not be intelligent to abstain
from subsidies, one should fight to abolish them altogether. I'm certainly
experiencing a conflict in doing this.


A: By the way, I don't think the American economy is socialized to quite the
same degree as Germany's; have you ever thought about coming here?

>> Yes, as I felt more confident. I wanted to make it big in Germany first
and then come over. Idle dreams. If I'm lucky, my children can become
Americans.


A: Ethically, this issue is obviously very tricky.  But as I show in Section
V of the course, it is characteristic of statist societies that they force
such ethical dilemmas upon the individual, thereby encouraging all kinds of
hypocrisy and dishonesty.  Statist societies discourage people to act
virtuously, whereas free societies naturally encourage them to discover and
practice the virtues.

>> Absolutely. So we can't criticize businessmen who are taking what is
legally their right.

Alexander
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Rob, 9/15/03:

> Of course complex human behavior cannot be predicted on the basis of physical laws, but it can be predicted in principle (!), as the behavior of lower life forms can be predicted. There are a lot of sciences dealing with the prediction and control of human behavior: biology, medicine, psychiatry, psychology, ethics, politics...

A:  Yes, sciences like psychology attempt to predict human behavior, but they do not claim to aspire to complete, precise prediction--which ought to be possible, according to determinists. Nor do they try to reduce such behavior to the physical laws of neural networks, as materialism would suggest.  You seem to have forgotten where this discussion began.  Originally, you claimed that science had to be both deterministic and materialistic.  You also faulted Objectivism for supposedly being unscientific, although you were unclear as to whether it was (a) too deterministic and materialistic or (b) not deterministic and materialistic enough.  (It depends on which of your e-mails one reads.)

I am merely saying that science isn't as deterministic and materialistic as you imagine.

Regarding determinism:  Yes, science looks for cause and effect, and attempts to make predictions--but it recognizes that its predictions are typically only probabilistic, particularly in the field of human behavior, but even in a supposed "hard" science like physics.

Regarding materialism:  Yes, good scientists are aware of the impact of physical circumstances on human behavior, but they don't try to reduce the latter to the former.
-----------------
>> The obstacle arises from the fact that micro and macro phenomena are not
neatly separated....

> From my understanding, micro and macro phenomena can be separated, since the principles governing the micro level seem to find their dividing line (horizon) at a certain microscopic level where they ~don't~ translate into macro phenomena which they are a part of. That the position of a electron, for example, can only be predicted in probabilistic terms, doesn't mean that it is governed by the same "laws" as they can be observed in quantum mechanics. It's just a epistemological problem, not a metaphysical one. If I'm not totally misinformed, the Newtonian laws are here in place as everywhere else in our directly experienced environment.

A:  I'm not a physicist either, but I understand that the micro/macro separation is for purposes of conceptual analysis, and it is not a neat separation.  Newton's laws are now regarded as convenient approximations, which tend to be more accurate at the macro level, but even there they are only approximations.  According to quantum mechanics, we cannot predict the motions even of large bodies precisely, because there is always a finite (perhaps very small, but > 0) probability that a larger body will be in a position significantly different than that predicted by Newtonian mechanics.
-----------------
> You err with the comparison of the neural system with a rubber ball too. What single neurons
are doing is perfectly predictable, the problem is just their amount and the complexity of the network.

A:  If the motions of the component particles in the neural system is not perfectly predictable, then a fortiori the operation of the whole system is not perfectly predictable either, either in practice or "in principle" (whatever the latter means).  In fact, in a highly complex, highly decentralized system like a neural network, one might well expect that tiny deviations at the micro level might well be amplified and magnified as their effects propagated through the system.
-----------------
> I never said that human behavior can be predicted "precisely", I said only "in principle."

A:  Leaving aside the conundrum of what "in principle" means, I'll just point out that determinism claims that behavior can in principle be predicted PRECISELY.  It sounds to me like you are retreating from true determinism, that you are now asserting only that there are causal factors that make human behavior predictable to a large degree.  If that is your position, then I have no difficulty with that, and neither does Objectivism.
------------------
>> The Objectivist view of the matter, as I explain in the course, assumes only that actions are caused ("determined," if you prefer) by entities (rather than by previous actions), and that consequently those actions must be consistent with the nature of the acting entities.

> How can a entity "cause" something without a action??? It is the same if you say that a action is caused by another entity or by another action.

A:  No, it's not the same thing at all.  If actions are caused by entities, then the event is initiated by the acting entity, and not by some PRIOR action.  Of course, the entities may themselves be influenced by other events impinging on them, and as a consequence their behavior may be influenced by those external events.  But HOW the entity acts in the context of those external events depends first of all on the nature of the entity. 

The Objectivist interpretation (entity-->action), by the way, is the classical metaphysical view, coming straight from Aristotle.  I bring this up because you seemed to think in your earlier e-mail that it came from some non-Aristotelian "freaky ontology."  The Objectivist view is also described very articulately by Nathaniel Branden in The Psychology of Self-Esteem.  In my course,
I cover it beginning at page 1.4:10 (http://www.humanactioncourse.info/pp/cc/HF40010.html).  In particular, try out my visual illustration on the second page of that discussion (assumes you have Java enabled on your browser), showing why the nature of an action depends on the nature of the acting entity.
-------------------
>> ...we can best understand the operations of modern software using advanced software concepts, rather than by analyzing the underlying and-gates and or-gates.

>I agree, but that doesn't invalidate determinism as an ontological fact.  BTW -- you already mentioned them before -- what are "or- and and-gates"?

A:  At their most detailed, closest-to-the-hardware level, computers operate by funneling electric and magnetic fields through "gates" modelled on the "AND," "OR," and "NOT" operators in Boolean algebra.  I originally brought up the and- and or-gates because you had stated that "consciousness is what a nervous system does and cannot be separated from its material basis, such as software cannot be seen aside its medium or hardware."  My point was that software analysts no longer think in terms of the hardware medium underlying the software.  If we wish to understand how a piece of sophisticated modern software operates, thinking in terms of and- and or-gates would be next to useless--just as the physical laws that govern the operations of the component particles in the brain's neural network would be irrelevant to the psychologist who sought to understand how consciousness operates.
-------------------
>>In fact, if our actions were indeed mechanistically determined by biological drives, then there would be no need for ethics at all--since the function of ethics is to guide our choices, and if our actions are mechanistically determined, we do not really make choices.

> That's not true. First, "drives" are values, and ethics, as we have learned, deals with values.

A:  As I point out in the course, the term "value" has two principal meanings.  Your argument here hinges on the ambiguity in the word.  "Drives" are values in the sense of SUBJECTIVE values--roughly speaking.  (More precisely, insofar as one may choose not to act on a particular drive, it may not be realized even as a subjective value.)  Ethics, in contrast, deals with OBJECTIVE values.  Ethical goals, in other words, may sometimes conflict with what you call our "drives."  Furthermore, if we could determine ethical standards merely by analyzing our biological "drives," we would not need ethics at all--the science of biology would suffice.  So my question remains:  why do we need ethics?  Once one answers that question, it becomes much clearer what ethics is all about and how ethical standards should be derived.
-------------------
> They [biological "drives"] can be rational or irrational, and the more derived they are, the greater is the risk that they are irrational.

A:  What do you consider "rational"?  What is "rational" depends on the goals one is seeking.  If we decide which goals are rational just by looking at the "drives" themselves, then how could the drives be "irrational"?
-------------------
> Second, that our choices are in the background all "mechanistically" determined, is for our day-to-day practice of living irrelevant. Our very consciousness is the expression of "complex mechanics" and that doesn't change anything about its usefulness or instrumentality.

A:  What do you consider "useful" or "instrumental"?  Again, these terms depend on the goals one is seeking.  If our actions are mechanistically determined by biological "drives," then what would it mean to say that an action was not useful or instrumental to those drives?
-------------------
> We should exercise it [consciousness] to prevent more primitive areas of our brain to make false decisions.

A:  What do you consider a "false" decision?  If "true" decisions are the ones that serve the goals defined by biological "drives," how can our (allegedly) mechanistically driven behavior reflect "false" decisions?
-------------------
> That all of our choices, like every phenomenon in existence, are determined, says nothing about their functionality. Determined processes can be functional or dysfunctional.

A:  What do you consider "functional"?  If "functional" means only "serving one's biological 'drives'," then how can behavior stemming from such "drives" be dysfunctional?
-------------------
> Ethics, as a science, is needed by complex being like humans.

A:  Agreed--provided you are using the concept "need" precisely.  An individual needs ethics in a precise sense:  ethics is required in order to maintain or enhance his life as an organism.  Grandchildren and genes have nothing to do with it--except, of course, insofar as having grandchildren may enhance a given individual's own life.
-------------------
> You can be evil for someone only if you initiate force or fraud against him/her. When you are sabotaging your own happiness you are only irrational, not evil.

A:  Here I must emphatically disagree.  Ethical concepts such as "good" and "evil" are just as applicable in a non-social context--such as Crusoe on a deserted island.  If Crusoe is to survive (much less to thrive!), his behavior must be guided by ethical principles, such as rationality, productivity, and so forth.  That is, he NEEDS ethics, in the same sense I cited above.  In fact, it could be argued that he needs it more crucially than ever.

Hierarchically, ethics must come before politics (where the issue of initiating force arises).  After all, if there were no prior ethical standards, then on what basis could we regard even the initiation of force as evil?  Or are we simply to define the latter as evil arbitrarily?  (This approach, unfortunately taken by some libertarians, is diametrically opposed to the Objectivist view.)  If there were not some prior basis for ethical judgments, then what would be the logical basis for regarding the initiation of force as evil?  Would it not be just as logical (or illogical) to define the initiation of force as a "good" thing, while regarding peaceful behavior as "evil"?  Even if we agree that my initiating force against you might be "bad" for you, why could we not arbitrarily define it as "good" behavior for me, if there is no prior standard for "good" and "evil"?
-------------------
> Where on his path exactly do you think he [my former friend] made a critical error? Is it more that he resorted to fatalism/defeatism (which is not the same as determinism), or that he couldn't defend his ontological viewpoints intellectually?

A:  The more critical error, in my opinion, was that he concluded that his supposed "choices" were determined by his environment and genes, and that he therefore could not control the future direction of his life.  Although you distinguish between determinism and fatalism/defeatism, it is hard to see how one can truly and fully believe the former without lapsing into the latter.  Here again, I'm using the term "determinism" in its philosophical sense.  Personally, I embrace the principle of causality, and I believe that even human behavior can be predicted to a large degree--but that doesn't make me a philosophical determinist.  I don't believe that my behavior is entirely determined by prior events or genes or any combination of the two.
------------------
>> in seeking out confirmation for their beliefs, rational people don't ask for an opinion poll:  they go directly to reality....

> You'll probably accusing me of social metaphysics, but other people are a part of reality, and we must deal with them, taking their views in account.

A:  No, I'm not accusing YOU of social metaphysics:  I'm accusing people who indulge in faith of it.  One of the problems with an e-mail discussion like this one is that people tend to forget where a given exchange started.  In this case, you suggested as an advantage of faith that it supposedly made people feel "blissful."  In response, I asked (among other questions) why so many faithful people were driven so desperately to convert others to their faith, if they were so blissfully content.  You responded by saying that a "psychologically healthy and expanding individual will seek out confirmation for his beliefs."  I therefore pointed out that confirmation for our beliefs about reality should come from that reality, not from other people.  Of course "other people are a part of reality" with whom faithful people must deal.  But that doesn't mean that they should have to convert us to their mystical beliefs in order for those beliefs to become true.  In practice, faithful people are not interested in examining whether their beliefs are realistic.  They have abandoned reality, and that is why they are so uncomfortable with the notion that everyone else does not believe as they do.  And for that reason, I do not think that a highly intelligent, aware person could live by faith and be truly blissful.

Rob
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Alexander, 9/29/03:
A:  Yes, sciences like psychology attempt to predict human behavior, but
they do not claim to aspire to complete, precise prediction--which ought to be
possible, according to determinists. Nor do they try to reduce such behavior
to the physical laws of neural networks, as materialism would suggest. 

>> Yes, ?complete, precise prediction? ought to be possible, but, as I
already tried to explain to you, only in principle, which in fact with todays (as
with tomorrows) technology can?t be done. If they don?t ultimetaly reduce
such, as any other, behavior to the physical laws, they should. Matter is
matter, no matter whether organic or anorganic. Fundamentally, it all follows the
same rules.


A: You seem to have forgotten where this discussion began.  Originally, you
claimed that science had to be both deterministic and materialistic.  You
also faulted Objectivism for supposedly being unscientific, although you were
unclear as to whether it was (a) too deterministic and materialistic or (b) not
deterministic and materialistic enough.  (It depends on which of your
e-mails one reads.)

>> Again, I haven?t clearly distinguished between Objectivism in its
orthodox and a logically consistent form as I see it. Your (b) is applicable for
the
first, your (a) -- although without the ?too? -- for the second.


A: I am merely saying that science isn't as deterministic and materialistic
as you imagine.

Regarding determinism:  Yes, science looks for cause and effect, and
attempts to make predictions--but it recognizes that its predictions are typically
only probabilistic, particularly in the field of human behavior, but even in a
supposed "hard" science like physics.

Regarding materialism:  Yes, good scientists are aware of the impact of
physical circumstances on human behavior, but they don't try to reduce the latter
to the former.

>> It isn?t practical to do it, but ultimetaly it is intellectually honest.
Regarding determinism: probabilistic it is only because of a lack of
sufficient technology, in principle exact predictions are not impossible. Of course,
the more compelx an object internally is, the longer it will take to master
it.
-----------------
A:  I'm not a physicist either, but I understand that the micro/macro
separation is for purposes of conceptual analysis, and it is not a neat separation.
 Newton's laws are now regarded as convenient approximations, which tend to
be more accurate at the macro level, but even there they are only
approximations.  According to quantum mechanics, we cannot predict the motions even
of
large bodies precisely, because there is always a finite (perhaps very small,
but > 0) probability that a larger body will be in a position significantly
different than that predicted by Newtonian mechanics.

>> GIGO. The better your data, the better the prediction will be. Has
nothing to do with freaky ontology. We live in an orderly, mechanistic world which
runs like a clockwork. I?m sure that the epistemological problem (in fact I
believe it?s a form of mysticism) begins at the subatomic level.
-----------------
A:  If the motions of the component particles in the neural system is not
perfectly predictable, then a fortiori the operation of the whole system is not
perfectly predictable either, either in practice or "in principle" (whatever
the latter means).  In fact, in a highly complex, highly decentralized
system like a neural network, one might well expect that tiny deviations at the
micro level might well be amplified and magnified as their effects propagated
through the system.

>> Sure, but the system stays predictable like the motions of each component
particle. The problem is a technological one, not an metaphysical. It can be
done IF our technology grows to be strong enough... one day in the future.
-----------------
A:  Leaving aside the conundrum of what "in principle" means, I'll just
point out that determinism claims that behavior can in principle be predicted
PRECISELY.  It sounds to me like you are retreating from true determinism, that
you are now asserting only that there are causal factors that make human
behavior predictable to a large degree.  If that is your position, then I have no
difficulty with that, and neither does Objectivism.

>> Yes, in an orderly universe, where the laws of identity and causality
reign unanomius, precise prediction is possible. For everything. ?In principle?
means there is no metaphysical law forbidding it, that?s just a question of
technological power.
------------------
A:  No, it's not the same thing at all.  If actions are caused by entities,
then the event is initiated by the acting entity, and not by some PRIOR
action.  Of course, the entities may themselves be influenced by other events
impinging on them, and as a consequence their behavior may be influenced by those
external events.  But HOW the entity acts in the context of those external
events depends first of all on the nature of the entity. 

>> This still doesn?t make any sense to me. Of course an entity might have
some internal ?mechanism? or processor of some sort that is influenced by
external events, but why don?t you just say that these external events ?cause?
istead of just ?influence? the entity?s actions? Are you just ?influencing?
your computer as you type the response to my objection?? Saying that something
?influences? something means that there are multiple causes, not that there is
no causation.
-------------------
A:  At their most detailed, closest-to-the-hardware level, computers operate
by funneling electric and magnetic fields through "gates" modelled on
the
"AND," "OR," and "NOT" operators in Boolean algebra.
I originally brought up
the and- and or-gates because you had stated that "consciousness is what a
nervous system does and cannot be separated from its material basis, such as
software cannot be seen aside its medium or hardware."  My point was that
software analysts no longer think in terms of the hardware medium underlying the
software.  If we wish to understand how a piece of sophisticated modern
software operates, thinking in terms of and- and or-gates would be next to
useless--just as the physical laws that govern the operations of the component
particles in the brain's neural network would be irrelevant to the psychologist
who
sought to understand how consciousness operates.

>> I agree. It would only be useful if we had that super computer that could
monitor or calculate all the positions of every particle in a object. The
next best thing we can do is to think in abstractions/concepts to reduce this
incredible amount of complexity.
-------------------
A:  As I point out in the course, the term "value" has two principal
meanings.  Your argument here hinges on the ambiguity in the word.  "Drives"
are
values in the sense of SUBJECTIVE values--roughly speaking.  (More precisely,
insofar as one may choose not to act on a particular drive, it may not be
realized even as a subjective value.)  Ethics, in contrast, deals with OBJECTIVE
values.  Ethical goals, in other words, may sometimes conflict with what you
call our "drives."  Furthermore, if we could determine ethical standards
merely by analyzing our biological "drives," we would not need ethics
at all--the
science of biology would suffice.  So my question remains:  why do we need
ethics?  Once one answers that question, it becomes much clearer what ethics is
all about and how ethical standards should be derived.

>> First, it is better to speak of irrational (dysfunctional) and rational
(functional) values instead of ?subjective? and ?objective? values. Yes,
ethics should be primarily about the identification of rational/objective
values/virtues, but it also can identify irrational/dysfunctional values/virtues.
If
an ?ethical? goal conflicts with a ?drive?, which is a very fundamental
value, then this goal must be irrational. (I don?t believe that there are
irrational ?drives?. But that may need some conceptually sorting out.) And indeed
the
science of biology, or more exactly: evolutionary psychology, is a form of
ethics, since it identifies the instrumentality of certain behavior
(?virtues?) in the context of life and reproduction. More traditional forms of ethics
become obsolete, as philosophy (like theology) in general becomes obsolete
with the advancement of scientific knowledge. We need it (philosophical
speculations) only where there is insufficient data provided by empirical findings.
-------------------
A:  What do you consider "rational"?  What is "rational" depends
on the
goals one is seeking.  If we decide which goals are rational just by looking at
the "drives" themselves, then how could the drives be "irrational"?

>> You are right, one must, I reluctantly admit, ?arbitrarily? set the
ultimate value, and being a biological ?conservative? (or ?expansionist?) I choose
what I named the ?grandchild principle?, i.e. reproduction over two
generations.
-------------------
A:  What do you consider "useful" or "instrumental"?  Again,
these terms
depend on the goals one is seeking.  If our actions are mechanistically
determined by biological "drives," then what would it mean to say that
an action was
not useful or instrumental to those drives?

>> Yes, it depends on the ultimate goal one is seeking, the highest, most
long-term value. If an action is not instrumental (dysfunctional), it means
that it hurts the ultimate value.
-------------------
A:  What do you consider a "false" decision?  If "true" decisions
are the
ones that serve the goals defined by biological "drives," how can our
(allegedly) mechanistically driven behavior reflect "false" decisions?

>> A ?false? decision is one that hurts our ultimate value. Failure is
possible in instinctual repsonses, animals for example can do the false things to
survive or to reproduce because they have just a limited, primitive
consciousness. That something is mechanistically driven doesn?t mean that it is
perfect or just optimized in the context of the ultimate value. Things go wrong,
dysfunctional mutations occur...
-------------------
A:  What do you consider "functional"?  If "functional" means
only "serving
one's biological 'drives'," then how can behavior stemming from such "drives"
be dysfunctional?

>> Because neither our brains nor your bodies are perfect. Furthermore,
behavior stemming from such "drives" can be dysfuchtional exactly because
it is
derived and not direct. Higher forms of consciousness have the advantage that
they can deal with a multitude of different survival problems, but that also
means that it can err where a more ?primitive? response would be appropriate.
For example, that we can be persuaded means not only that we can be won for
the cooperation on compelx tasks, but also that the genes of another
individual or group can lead us astray in being irrational in the context of our
highest value, even to the point to abandoning it. I like to speak of
?competitive persuasion? between different populations or socio-economic classes.
Keywords here are ?ideology?, ?morality? and ?false consciousness? as weapons.
-------------------
A:  Agreed--provided you are using the concept "need" precisely.  An
individual needs ethics in a precise sense:  ethics is required in order to maintain
or enhance his life as an organism.  Grandchildren and genes have nothing to
do with it--except, of course, insofar as having grandchildren may enhance a
given individual's own life.

>> Enhancing ones life as an organism means psychologically flourishing by
preserving ones genes and that of ones children and grandchildren. Evolution
?selected? this psychological mechanism to facilitate expansion. Any
mutation/deviation from this natural code of values only puts scarce resources in
the
hands of competing individuals.
-------------------
A:  Here I must emphatically disagree.  Ethical concepts such as "good"
and
"evil" are just as applicable in a non-social context--such as Crusoe
on a
deserted island.  If Crusoe is to survive (much less to thrive!), his behavior
must be guided by ethical principles, such as rationality, productivity, and
so forth.  That is, he NEEDS ethics, in the same sense I cited above.  In
fact, it could be argued that he needs it more crucially than ever.

>> I wasn?t talking about ethical concepts as such, only about ?evil?! Of
course you are totally right in regard to ethics as such.
 

A: Hierarchically, ethics must come before politics (where the issue of
initiating force arises).  After all, if there were no prior ethical standards,
then on what basis could we regard even the initiation of force as evil?  Or
are we simply to define the latter as evil arbitrarily?  (This approach,
unfortunately taken by some libertarians, is diametrically opposed to the
Objectivist view.)  If there were not some prior basis for ethical judgments, then
what would be the logical basis for regarding the initiation of force as evil?
Would it not be just as logical (or illogical) to define the initiation of
force as a "good" thing, while regarding peaceful behavior as "evil"?
Even if
we agree that my initiating force against you might be "bad" for you,
why
could we not arbitrarily define it as "good" behavior for me, if there
is no
prior standard for "good" and "evil"?

>> Who says we cannot? In fact, I do it. If an action, like the initiation
of force against me by you serves your ultimate value -- and this is what I
suppose in this example without stating that it?s right in reality -- then it
is ?good? for you and at the same time ?evil? for me... and vice versa. I
don?t see where the problem to understand this lies. (This reminds me of an
discussion I had some time ago on H.P.O.:
www.philodata.de/Inhalte/Egoismusproblem.htm.)
-------------------
A:  The more critical error, in my opinion, was that he concluded that his
supposed "choices" were determined by his environment and genes, and that
he
therefore could not control the future direction of his life.  Although you
distinguish between determinism and fatalism/defeatism, it is hard to see how
one can truly and fully believe the former without lapsing into the latter.
Here again, I'm using the term "determinism" in its philosophical sense.
Personally, I embrace the principle of causality, and I believe that even human
behavior can be predicted to a large degree--but that doesn't make me a
philosophical determinist.  I don't believe that my behavior is entirely determined
by prior events or genes or any combination of the two.

>> You are right, determinism with a focus on ?being determined? oftentimes
leads to fatalism/defeatism. But on the same time I believe that determinism
with the focus on ?determining?, and that?s what we do as ?agents of action?,
could be the core of a new form of spirituality, if not even an entire
religion. The forces of cause and effect ?flow? through our bodies which are
?knots? in the eternal stream of matter! It would allow at the same time to feel
?connectedness? with the universe and experiencing oneself as potent, even
forceful agent of change. I find this view extremely fascinating, having much
room for intellectual elaboration.
------------------
A:  No, I'm not accusing YOU of social metaphysics:  I'm accusing people who
indulge in faith of it.  One of the problems with an e-mail discussion like
this one is that people tend to forget where a given exchange started.  In
this case, you suggested as an advantage of faith that it supposedly made
people feel "blissful."  In response, I asked (among other questions)
why so many
faithful people were driven so desperately to convert others to their faith,
if they were so blissfully content.  You responded by saying that a
"psychologically healthy and expanding individual will seek out confirmation
for his
beliefs."  I therefore pointed out that confirmation for our beliefs about
reality should come from that reality, not from other people.  Of course "other
people are a part of reality" with whom faithful people must deal.  But that
doesn't mean that they should have to convert us to their mystical beliefs in
order for those beliefs to become true.  In practice, faithful people are
not interested in examining whether their beliefs are realistic.  They have
abandoned reality, and that is why they are so uncomfortable with the notion
that everyone else does not believe as they do.  And for that reason, I do not
think that a highly intelligent, aware person could live by faith and be truly
blissful.

>> You?re probably right in regard to religionists.

Alexander
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Alexander, 10/1/2003 (forwarded from ARI):

From: The Ayn Rand Institute <larryb@aynrand.org>
To: rationalevidence@gmx.de
Subject: Press Release: The Crisis in Physics--and Its Cause

> Press Release from the Ayn Rand Institute
>
> The Crisis in Physics--and Its Cause
>
> Who: David Harriman, M.S. in physics, editor of Journals of Ayn Rand
> and senior writer for the Ayn Rand Institute. Mr. Harriman has
> lectured extensively on the history and philosophy of physics.
>
> What: Lecture titled "The Crisis in Physics--and Its Cause" followed
> by a Q&A. The public and media are invited. Admission is free.
>
> Where: Hyatt Regency Irvine, 17900 Jamboree Blvd., Irvine, CA
>
> When: Tuesday, October 14, 2003, at 7:30 PM
>
> Irvine, CA -- For two centuries after Isaac Newton, the science of
> physics served as the leading example of the power of the human mind.
> Its basic content and method, and the life-saving technology that
> emerged from it, sent a message that resounded throughout the western
> world: man can live and prosper by the guidance of reason.
>
> However, for the past century, theoretical physicists have been
> sending a different message. They have rejected causality in favor of
> chance, logic in favor of contradictions, and reality in favor of
> fantasy. The science of physics is now riddled with claims that are as
> absurd as those of any religious cult.
>
> This lecture examines the historical development of such ideas and
> refutes the myth that they derive from experimental evidence. History
> shows that philosophers provided the irrational ideas, which
> physicists then incorporated into their theories. Philosophy is the
> inescapable foundation for physics, and the irrationalism of modern
> philosophy is the quicksand that engulfed physics in the 20th century.
> Mr. Harriman argues that our future depends upon saving physics--which
> can only be done by providing it with the solid ground of a rational
> philosophy.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Rob, 10/15/03:

Alexander,

I wanted to make two observations about this press release:

1.  Notice the relationship it suggests between (a) orthodox Objectivism and (b) modern physics as it is understood by most physicists.  Whereas most modern physicists would argue for indeterminism, the brand of Objectivism espoused by ARI would argue instead in favor of a deterministic causality, at least in this area of science.  Regardless of who is right or wrong in this issue, the debate between the two camps seems to contradict your idea that "the sciences are deterministic" and that Objectivism must be unscientific because it rejects determinism.  If anything, ARI's press release seems to indicate the exact opposite.

2.  In any case, I wouldn't look to ARI's "experts" for legitimate physics.  The thinkers at ARI, in my opinion, have a conspicuous tendency to substitute intuitive assumptions, based on familiar experience, for true logical reasoning.  This tendency is particularly pernicious in the area of physics, where our intuition is based on our common macro-level terrestrial experience, probably reinforced by millions of years of evolution in that environment.  Such limited intuition may not transfer well to events in less familiar environments, involving phenomena such as velocities approaching the speed of light, boundaries of black holes, and subatomic particles.  Things like space-time singularities and quantum tunneling just aren't part of our everyday experience.

Newton's theory provides a good model for our everyday experience, because its equations approximate very closely how the objects in that experience (i. e., larger objects) usually behave, provided that their velocities are very small relative to the speed of light.  Yet quite a few scientific observations, ranging from astronomical observations to results from particle accelerators, clearly conflict with Newton's equations and are better explained by modern theory.  Harriman, nevertheless, would apparently like to return to Newtonian theory; an article by him on the ARI website is nostalgically titled "Where Have You Gone, Isaac Newton?".  Does this mean that he would prefer to ignore all of the observations that conflict with Newton and are better explained by general relativism and by quantum mechanics?  If he follows the principle he states in his own article--that is, that science should be "a step-by-step process that takes us from observations to abstractions, generalizations and theories"--then he must accept the fact that there is more to physics than Newton.  (Indeed, Newton was such a high-level genius that he would doubtless be at work revising his theory, were he alive today.)  Furthermore, Harriman cannot ignore the existence of the technology flowing from modern physical theory--including nuclear power (based on general-relativistic theory) and the integrated circuits composing modern computers (based in part on quantum mechanics).  Unfortunately, Harriman seems more inclined to ridicule modern theory, remarking, for instance, that the space-time of modern physics "attends yoga classes."  (Note how he substitutes the knife of satire for the microscope of logic.)

Harriman and I would agree on one point:  modern physics needs a sound epistemological and metaphysical basis, drawn from a philosophy of logic and reason.  But if we really believe in logic and reason, we cannot ignore all of the observations that inconveniently conflict with our past experience.  Inevitably, we must recognize that space and time are more complex than we thought and that Newton's "clockwork" model of the universe is inadequate.  We must approach the world without prejudice, seeking to make sense of all the available data--not just the subset of data that seems right intuitively.  In short, Objectivist science should be objective.

I'll respond to your previous e-note soon.

Rob
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Alexander, 10/16/03:

> Alexander,
>
> I wanted to make two observations about this press release:
>
> 1.  Notice the relationship it suggests between (a) orthodox Objectivism
> an
> d (b) modern physics as it is understood by most physicists.  Whereas most
> modern physicists would argue for indeterminism, the brand of Objectivism
> e
> spoused by ARI would argue instead in favor of a deterministic causality,
> a
> t least in this area of science.  Regardless of who is right or wrong in
> th
> is issue, the debate between the two camps seems to contradict your idea
> th
> at "the sciences are deterministic" and that Objectivism must be
> unscientif
> ic because it rejects determinism.  If anything, ARI's press release seems
> to indicate the exact opposite.

You're mixing something up: I stated that my view of what I consider to be
objective science is (fully) deterministic and I criticized orthodox
Objectivism's indeterminism not in micro-level physics but in psychology. So I agree
with ARI in the first and I disagree with it in the latter.



> 2.  In any case, I wouldn't look to ARI's "experts" for legitimate
> physics.
>   The thinkers at ARI, in my opinion, have a conspicuous tendency to
> substi
> tute intuitive assumptions, based on familiar experience, for true logical
> reasoning.  This tendency is particularly pernicious in the area of
> physics
> , where our intuition is based on our common macro-level terrestrial
> experi
> ence, probably reinforced by millions of years of evolution in that
> environ
> ment.  Such limited intuition may not transfer well to events in less
> famil
> iar environments, involving phenomena such as velocities approaching the
> sp
> eed of light, boundaries of black holes, and subatomic particles.  Things
> l
> ike space-time singularities and quantum tunneling just aren't part of our
> everyday experience.Newton's theory provides a good model for our everyday
> experience, because its equations approximate very closely how the objects
> in that experience (i. e., larger objects) usually behave, provided that
> th
> eir velocities are very small relative to the speed of light.  Yet quite a
> few scientific observations, ranging from astronomical observations to
> resu
> lts from particle accelerators, clearly conflict with Newton's equations
> an
> d are better explained by modern theory.  Harriman, nevertheless, would
> app
> arently like to return to Newtonian theory; an article by him on the ARI
> we
> bsite is nostalgically titled "Where Have You Gone, Isaac Newton?".
Does
> t
> his mean that he would prefer to ignore all of the observations that
> confli
> ct with Newton and are better explained by general relativism and by
> quantu
> m mechanics?  If he follows the principle he states in his own
> article--tha
> t is, that science should be "a step-by-step process that takes us from
> obs
> ervations to abstractions, generalizations and theories"--then he must
> acce
> pt the fact that there is more to physics than Newton.  (Indeed, Newton
> was
>  such a high-level genius that he would doubtless be at work revising his
> t
> heory, were he alive today.)  Furthermore, Harriman cannot ignore the
> exist
> ence of the technology flowing from modern physical theory--including
> nucle
> ar power (based on general-relativistic theory) and the integrated
> circuits
>  composing modern computers (based in part on quantum mechanics).
> Unfortun
> ately, Harriman seems more inclined to ridicule modern theory, remarking,
> f
> or instance, that the space-time of modern physics "attends yoga classes."
>  (Note how he substitutes the knife of satire for the microscope of
> logic.)
>
> Harriman and I would agree on one point:  modern physics needs a sound
> epis
> temological and metaphysical basis, drawn from a philosophy of logic and
> re
> ason.  But if we really believe in logic and reason, we cannot ignore all
> o
> f the observations that inconveniently conflict with our past experience.
> Inevitably, we must recognize that space and time are more complex than we
> thought and that Newton's "clockwork" model of the universe is inadequate.
>  We must approach the world without prejudice, seeking to make sense of
> all
>  the available data--not just the subset of data that seems right
> intuitive
> ly.  In short, Objectivist science should be objective.

We already both acknowledged that we're no physicists, and I'm ready to
admit that my mathematical abilities are far from sufficient to make up my mind
that way. But since I'm not able to understand the specific reasoning I must
resort to what seems logical ~to me,~ and that's hard determinism, modern
physics notwhithstanding. How should we proceed? Since we obviously disagree, and
further discussions would require more competence on both sides, we could at
least agree on our disagreement.


> I'll respond to your previous e-note soon.

Great!

Alexander
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Rob, 10/16/03:

As you remarked, at some point we'll probably just have to "agree to disagree."  Instead of dealing with your last two e-notes point by point, I would like to confine my comments to the two major issues involved.

------- Issue 1:  Hard Determinism -------
I would define hard determinism as the belief that all events and actions are precisely fixed by previous events and actions.  If hard determinism is true, then one could deduce exactly what would happen in the future from what happened in the past and present, provided that one could somehow know the latter in complete detail.  That is why determinism lapses so easily into fatalism.

Note that hard determinism is an affirmative belief, in the same sense that theism is.  As a consequence, before adopting it within an Objectivist philosophical framework, one must first justify it by means of positive evidence or arguments.  It is not sufficient, as you suggested in your last note, merely to remark that it "seems logical."  We would have to justify it either by showing that hard determinism is philosophically axiomatic, or else by adducing empirical evidence for it.

The metaphysics of Objectivism, which does not differ substantially from that of Aristotle, regards causality as originating in the natures of entities.  That is, the actions of an entity are caused by the nature of the entity itself.  Of course, how an entity acts is often influenced by actions and events in its environment.  But the Aristotelian-Objectivist theory of causality does not assert that the behavior of the entity is directly caused by those environmental phenomena.  Consequently, Objectivist metaphysics does not necessitate determinism, although determinism may be consistent with it (as is also the theory of free will).  (Branden argues that determinism is inconsistent with a rational epistemology, but that is a separate issue.)  Thus hard determinism cannot be regarded as philosophically axiomatic.

If we were to attempt to justify it empirically, on the other hand, probably the most promising area to start in would be physics, since that is the science that so far has been most successful in predicting future events.  As we have already discussed, physics as we know it today can offer only approximate, probabilistic predictions.  Ironically, the same theory that offers the most precise mathematical predictions also entails an uncertainty principle, which imposes a theoretical (but mathematically precisely defined) limit on our potential powers of prediction.  You obviously believe that a more deterministic theory will be developed in the future, but that remains to be determined (no pun intended).

Modern physics presents another major obstacle to hard determinism, as defined above, in its view of time.  According to general relativity, the temporal sequence of events is not absolute, but relative to the observer.  That is, if I am traveling in a different frame of reference than you are, it is possible that event A may precede event B in my frame of reference, while event B precedes event A in yours.  It seems to me that this throws a monkey wrench into the machinery of hard determinism, which by definition asserts that events are caused by previous events.  Does event A "cause" event B, or does event B "cause" event A?  Interestingly, I think that the Objectivist-Aristotelian framework may be particularly well suited to upholding a rational view of causality in the face of the paradoxes presented by relativity theory.

You believe that "we live in an orderly, mechanistic world which runs like a clockwork."  Modern physics fails to offer us empirical evidence of such mechanistic clockwork.  On the other hand, I think that if the observations and theories of the scientists are interpreted within an Objectivist framework, the world does indeed turn out to be "orderly"--even if the order is far more subtle than Newton's "clockwork" model suggests.

------- Issue 2:  Spirituality and Determinism -------
This whole e-exchange, you will remember, began with your quest for greater spirituality.  Obviously, we have gone far afield in our discussion of determinism.  I remain mystified how you can on the one hand believe that we live in a clockwork-like, mechanistic world, and yet you also believe you can find resources of spirit in that world.

And what is really strange:  you fault Objectivism for not adhering enough to a deterministic, materialistic view of reality, and simultaneously for supposedly not granting a sufficient role to matters of spirit.

And please don't tell me that the matters of spirit transpire in some secondary, alternate reality.  Reality is simply what is.

Rob
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Alexander, 10/21/03:
> ------- Issue 1:  Hard Determinism -------
> I would define hard determinism as the belief that all events and actions
> a
> re precisely fixed by previous events and actions.  If hard determinism is
> true, then one could deduce exactly what would happen in the future from
> wh
> at happened in the past and present, provided that one could somehow know
> t
> he latter in complete detail.  That is why determinism lapses so easily
> int
> o fatalism.

Fatalism results from a pessimistic view of the determined outcomes. An
optimistic determinism is also possible!


> Note that hard determinism is an affirmative belief, in the same sense
> that
>  theism is.  As a consequence, before adopting it within an Objectivist
> phi
> losophical framework, one must first justify it by means of positive
> eviden
> ce or arguments.  It is not sufficient, as you suggested in your last
> note,
>  merely to remark that it "seems logical."  We would have to justify
it
> eit
> her by showing that hard determinism is philosophically axiomatic, or else
> by adducing empirical evidence for it.

Determinism follows from the axioms of identity and causality and cannot be
compared in quality with such unscientific claims as theism.


> The metaphysics of Objectivism, which does not differ substantially from
> th
> at of Aristotle, regards causality as originating in the natures of
> entitie
> s.  That is, the actions of an entity are caused by the nature of the
> entit
> y itself.  Of course, how an entity acts is often influenced by actions
> and
>  events in its environment.  But the Aristotelian-Objectivist theory of
> cau
> sality does not assert that the behavior of the entity is directly caused
> b
> y those environmental phenomena.  Consequently, Objectivist metaphysics
> doe
> s not necessitate determinism, although determinism may be consistent with
> it (as is also the theory of free will).  (Branden argues that determinism
> is inconsistent with a rational epistemology, but that is a separate
> issue.
> )  Thus hard determinism cannot be regarded as philosophically axiomatic.

I consider hard determinism philosophically axiomatic because it not only
"may" be consistent with Objectivist metaphysics but actually ~is~ consistent
with it. That the nature of the entities involved must be taken into account
(remember my computer example im my last posting) changes ~nothing~ that
ultimately actions determine actions.


> If we were to attempt to justify it empirically, on the other hand,
> probabl
> y the most promising area to start in would be physics, since that is the
> s
> cience that so far has been most successful in predicting future events.
> A
> s we have already discussed, physics as we know it today can offer only
> app
> roximate, probabilistic predictions.  Ironically, the same theory that
> offe
> rs the most precise mathematical predictions also entails an uncertainty
> pr
> inciple, which imposes a theoretical (but mathematically precisely
> defined)
>  limit on our potential powers of prediction.  You obviously believe that
> a
>  more deterministic theory will be developed in the future, but that
> remain
> s to be determined (no pun intended).

You are just repeating what you already said and what I already answered.
How precisely something can be predicted depends on the completeness of the
data you have access to. I doesn't change the fundamental fact that precise
prediction is metaphysically possible.


> Modern physics presents another major obstacle to hard determinism, as
> defi
> ned above, in its view of time.  According to general relativity, the
> tempo
> ral sequence of events is not absolute, but relative to the observer.
> That
>  is, if I am traveling in a different frame of reference than you are, it
> i
> s possible that event A may precede event B in my frame of reference,
> while
>  event B precedes event A in yours.  It seems to me that this throws a
> monk
> ey wrench into the machinery of hard determinism, which by definition
> asser
> ts that events are caused by previous events.  Does event A "cause"
event
> B
> , or does event B "cause" event A?  Interestingly, I think that the
> Objecti
> vist-Aristotelian framework may be particularly well suited to upholding a
> rational view of causality in the face of the paradoxes presented by
> relati
> vity theory.

I may not understand modern physics, but I recognize the fact that there are
alternative, Aristotelian explainations, which I philosophically prefer.


> You believe that "we live in an orderly, mechanistic world which runs
like
> a clockwork."  Modern physics fails to offer us empirical evidence of
such
> mechanistic clockwork.  On the other hand, I think that if the
> observations
>  and theories of the scientists are interpreted within an Objectivist
> frame
> work, the world does indeed turn out to be "orderly"--even if the
order is
> far more subtle than Newton's "clockwork" model suggests.

In regard to modern physics, see my answer above. There's only one future as
there's only one past.


> ------- Issue 2:  Spirituality and Determinism -------
> This whole e-exchange, you will remember, began with your quest for
> greater
>  spirituality.  Obviously, we have gone far afield in our discussion of
> det
> erminism.  I remain mystified how you can on the one hand believe that we
> l
> ive in a clockwork-like, mechanistic world, and yet you also believe you
> ca
> n find resources of spirit in that world.

I explained the starting-point of my belief that indeed determinism,
spiritually understood, can be that resource. You didn't answer anything to that
view.


> And what is really strange:  you fault Objectivism for not adhering enough
> to a deterministic, materialistic view of reality, and simultaneously for
> s
> upposedly not granting a sufficient role to matters of spirit.
>
> And please don't tell me that the matters of spirit transpire in some
> secon
> dary, alternate reality.  Reality is simply what is.

Of course. I never advocated any alternate reality. Ther's only one, and it
is "materialistic".

Alexander
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Rob, 10/21/03:

> Fatalism results from a pessimistic view of the determined outcomes. An optimistic determinism is also possible!

A:  Merriam-Webster's dictionary defines fatalism as "a doctrine that events are fixed in advance so that human beings are powerless to change them."  This definition, which reflects how the word is used in common practice, makes no specification as to whether the fixed events should be viewed optimistically or pessimistically.
--------------
> Determinism follows from the axioms of identity and causality and cannot be compared in quality with such unscientific claims as theism.

A:  The axiom of identity requires that the actions of an entity must be consistent with its nature.  Causality is not an axiom; rather, it is a corollary of the axiom of identity.  That is, because the actions of an entity must conform to its nature, we can say that those actions are "caused" by the entity itself.  Nothing about the axiom of identity requires that those actions are necessarily further constrained by anything outside the entity or by anything other than the nature of the entity.  Consequently, to assume that such additional constraints exist is to assert a positive, which requires evidence (or, at least, positive logical arguments), in the same sense that the assertion of the existence of a god does.
--------------
>> Interestingly, I think that the Objectivist-Aristotelian framework may be particularly well suited to upholding a rational view of causality in the face of the paradoxes presented by relativity theory.

> I may not understand modern physics, but I recognize the fact that there are alternative, Aristotelian explainations, which I philosophically prefer.

A:  If you reread what I said, you'll see that that's exactly my point:  The Aristotelian (and Objectivist) explanation of causality is preferable to the deterministic action-causes-action view, particularly for interpreting the observations of modern physics.
-------------
> There's only one future as there's only one past.

A:  Strictly speaking, there "is" only the present.  That is, the present EXISTS, whereas the past only EXISTED, and some future (which one remains to be determined) WILL EXIST.  I know that it may seem as if I'm splitting hairs here, but when we gloss over such distinctions by saying that "there's only one future," we make it seem as if hard determinism is the only logically consistent view--but then it's really just an artifact of our own sloppy use of tenses!
-------------
> Of course. I never advocated any alternate reality. Ther's only one, and it
is "materialistic".

A:  If so, and if "materialism" is to be understood in the bleak, mechanistic sense that you have depicted, then your quest for greater spirituality--and your criticism of Objectivism for not being "spiritual" enough--are as pointless as Don Quixote tilting at windmills.  And don't forget, that's where this whole conversation started.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From Alexander, 10/27/03:

> A:  Merriam-Webster's dictionary defines fatalism as "a doctrine that
> event
> s are fixed in advance so that human beings are powerless to change them."
>  This definition, which reflects how the word is used in common practice,
> m
> akes no specification as to whether the fixed events should be viewed
> optim
> istically or pessimistically.

Yes, and it implies that a proactive stance is futile. That qualifies as
pessimism for me.
 

> --------------
> A:  The axiom of identity requires that the actions of an entity must be
> co
> nsistent with its nature.  Causality is not an axiom; rather, it is a
> corol
> lary of the axiom of identity.  That is, because the actions of an entity
> m
> ust conform to its nature, we can say that those actions are "caused"
by
> th
> e entity itself.  Nothing about the axiom of identity requires that those
> a
> ctions are necessarily further constrained by anything outside the entity
> o
> r by anything other than the nature of the entity. 

Isn't the notion that entities can produce actions out of themselves similar
to those of the perpetuum mobile? It makes much more sense to me to imagine
entities being linked into a chain of events.

> Consequently, to
> assume
>  that such additional constraints exist is to assert a positive, which
> requ
> ires evidence (or, at least, positive logical arguments), in the same
> sense
>  that the assertion of the existence of a god does.

God's existence by definition cannot be empirically validated, while the law
of causality can be.


> --------------
> A:  If you reread what I said, you'll see that that's exactly my point:
> Th
> e Aristotelian (and Objectivist) explanation of causality is preferable to
> the deterministic action-causes-action view, particularly for interpreting
> the observations of modern physics.

By "Aristotelian" I meant the ~standard~ view of the law of identity and
causality, i.e. determinism.


> -------------
> A:  Strictly speaking, there "is" only the present.  That is, the
present
> E
> XISTS, whereas the past only EXISTED, and some future (which one remains
> to
>  be determined) WILL EXIST.  I know that it may seem as if I'm splitting
> ha
> irs here, but when we gloss over such distinctions by saying that "there's
> only one future," we make it seem as if hard determinism is the only
> logica
> lly consistent view--but then it's really just an artifact of our own
> slopp
> y use of tenses!

I must admit that I don't understand your point. Given one specific present,
how many metaphysically possible futures do you believe exist? If the law of
identity and causaliy is universal, the possibilities are reduced to "one."


> -------------
> A:  If so, and if "materialism" is to be understood in the bleak,
> mechanist
> ic sense that you have depicted, then your quest for greater
> spirituality--
> and your criticism of Objectivism for not being "spiritual" enough--are
as
> pointless as Don Quixote tilting at windmills.  And don't forget, that's
> wh
> ere this whole conversation started.

I don't think so. In one of my last replies I pointed out that one can focus
on both the determining parts of life and the ones to be individually
determined. In developing this view I see much potential for a arising new
spirituality which is scientifically valid... perhaps even a new "religion"
--
without alternate realities.

Alexander
------------------
From Alexander, 11/20/03:

Rob,

I'd like to publish valuable discussions on my private site
(www.philodata.de). I consider our discussion to fall in this category. Would you
give me
permission to use it?

Alexander
------------
From Rob, 11/20/03:

Alexander,

Feel free to publish it on your site.  Personally, I'm not sure I agree with your assessment of the discussion.  I think we ended up going around in circles and making little meaningful progress toward true understanding.  Example from our last two e-mails:  I point out that the future does not really "exist" (in the present tense), and you respond by asking me "how many" of them exist.

On the other hand, I think that my remarks in the course of this discussion were carefully considered, so I have no problem with your posting them alongside your own.  I used a somewhat looser and breezier writing style than I normally would in comments intended for publication, but I think your readers will understand that the style was appropriate in the context of an e-mail exchange.

Rob