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THE HAPPY ROBOT!

I'm a huge fan of Objectivist metaphysics and epistemology - it was these that opened my eyes to the possibility of actually discovering important truths by studying philosophy. I am a big fan of the ethics, too, which show people they should proudly put themselves as their own highest value. However, as I will show, Ayn Rand's fundamental assertion that "an organism's life is it's standard of value" (emphasis mine), and therefore man's proper basis for morality and ethics needs to be replaced with the idea that an organism's happiness is it's standard of value. Ultimately, I agree with her that an individual should act in accordance with the demands of life, but not because that is an end in itself - rather, because it is a means to achieve the ultimate value, the true end-in-itself, happiness. Without happiness, biological life becomes mechanistic and valueless and even the most perfectly rational animal will find no reason to pursue it.

In this essay, I first hope to establish that, although metaphysically and biologically it is the alternative of life/death that resulted in consciousness, volition and the capacity for happiness/unhappiness in humans, it is the happiness/unhappiness alternative - however created - that gives rise to all our values. After unseating life from the pinnacle of our values, I'll reintroduce a more broadly defined form of life which I call "genetic life" - but now as a close second to happiness in the hierarchy of values. From there, I'll briefly trace the Objectivist reasoning with happiness replacing life. Finally, I'll show how some difficult problems Objectivism has had, go away when you place happiness in it's rightful spot and put genetic life as the ultimate value serving happiness. (Although I will leave happiness as self-evident for the purpose of this essay, if a definition and description of "happiness" is desired to better understand what is replacing "life" here as the ultimate value, I would direct the reader to Ted Keer's essay, »Happiness: Passionate Serenity as the best effort I've seen to date.)

In The Virtue of Selfishness, Rand says "To challenge the basic premise of . . . ethics, one must begin by asking: What are values? Why does man need them?". (VOS, p16) Since this is, indeed, the challenge I am making, I will follow her instruction. For the first question, I accept Rand's answer, and I hope to correct her answer to the second question. In answer to the first question, Rand says:

"Value" is that which one acts to gain or keep. The concept "value" is not a primary; it presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what? It presupposes an entity capable of acting to achieve a goal in the face of an alternative. Where no alternative exists, no goals and no values are possible.

The alternative she then focuses on is that of life or death. Her answer to the question "Why does man need values?" is: to stay alive. For any living organism, "the ultimate value . . . is the organism's life." (VOS, p17 - emphasis Rand's)

To make her point "fully clear", she asks us to "imagine an immortal, indestructible robot", and claims "such an entity would not be able to have any values". (VOS, p16) Notice that Rand did not choose a hypothetical indestructible organism but rather an indestructible robot. The significance of this distinction is that the word "robot", and indeed her description of this entity, make clear that she is asking us to imagine an entity which, in addition to being immortal, is also unfeeling (i.e. incapable of happiness or unhappiness). Thus, we have a contrast between Rand's immortal and unfeeling entity, and the mortal, feeling entities whose source of values we are trying to determine.

But which of these two alternatives, life/death (mortality) or happiness/unhappiness (feeling) is truly the one that gives rise to values? Or do values perhaps require both? To sort this out we need two new hypothetical entities, each with one of these alternatives, but not the other. One entity would be immortal and feeling - call this entity "IF". The other would be mortal and unfeeling - call it "MU". If we can demonstrate that one of these entities has a source of values (and thus a means for decision making, a way to judge right and wrong for itself, etc.), and the other does not, then we have identified the alternative that is the true source of values for humans. If neither stands on its own then it must be the combination that is required.

First, consider MU: Being mortal implies that certain actions are required for MU to maintain life, but nothing about life feels good to MU and nothing about death feels bad. MU is left with no way to "prefer" life and so has nothing driving any decision. All MU can do is decide by whim whether it will try to live or not - perhaps by flipping a coin - and then act accordingly. Or maybe considering that alternative would never seem very important to it and instead it would employ its volition deciding some other randomly selected alternative - again by flipping a coin since it won't care either way. But then, it might occur to MU that deciding and acting isn't really all it's cracked up to be, at which point it might just sit down (or not) and stare blankly at the moss beginning to grow on its shady side.

Now consider IF: Although there is no way for its existence to end, IF does indeed care that painful things do not happen to it and that pleasurable things do. If it felt pain from heat, it would have every bit as much impetus to remove its hand (if it had one) from a hot stove as you or I would. Also, if it felt a deep satisfaction from developing relationships with other entities, the fact that it doesn't need them to survive would not stop it from deriving as much joy from such relationships as it could. If it got the kind of pleasure from sex that humans do, it would definitely spend a lot of time at that. Of course it might also just do heroin constantly - except that simply not dying probably does not make that form of pleasure workable over the long haul.

Clearly, only IF has a way to judge what is right and wrong for it; MU does not. This means it is, indeed, the alternative of happiness/unhappiness, the ability to feel, to care, to give a rip, that drives the need and the use for morality, not the alternative of life or death. Which in turn means happiness, not life, is the ultimate value, the end-in-itself toward which every action of an organism is properly directed. Interestingly, it seems that Rand herself at times saw that happiness was actually the ultimate value. For example, as part of Galt's speech in Atlas Shrugged, she writes: "Life is the reward of virtue, and happiness is the goal and reward of life." (AS, p.939) This is a pretty clear statement of the relation between life and happiness, with happiness being the end-in-itself, with no further explanation necessary - or possible.

Of course, the fact that all the capacity for pleasure and pain in humans developed because it furthered "life" in some way means that the requirements of "life" is a pretty good estimate of what is likely to make us happy. Consequently, I place "life" second only to happiness in the hierarchy of values. However, this "life" - the evolution of which resulted in our happiness/unhappiness mechanisms - is not the life of an individual organism, which Rand talked about as being its highest value. It is now a broader form, call it "genetic life", that spans individual lives and of which an individual life is only a part. Maybe we can think of it this way: since genetic life needs us as individuals to make decisions in it's favor, it has created an incentive program for the volitional individuals which make it up - to make it in our interest to act in its interest. The better we understand genetic life and its requirements, the more likely we are to find pursuing it helpful in achieving our ultimate goal - happiness.

In this essay, I will stop short of defining precisely what this "genetic life" is, the pursuit of which will best serve the happiness of an individual. It may be the genetic code contained in that individual's cells, it may be the gene-pool of its interbreeding group or its species, or it may be as broad as all life. I personally expect to find that it is a hierarchy of some sort, where genetic codes more similar to our own are valued more than, but not to the exclusion of, codes more distant. We care about our own children, but we also care about the children of others, animals other than humans and maybe even insects or plants to a lesser degree. However, it is the job of science, not philosophy, to define and describe this genetic life that is the ultimate source of our happiness.

Philosophy gets us to "happiness" as our ultimate goal, but it is the scientific study of evolution that has to take it from there. In fact, if it turned out evolution was wrong and we were created by some super-entity (to pick a contending theory still quite popular today), philosophy would still get us to happiness as our ultimate value, but the study of that super-entity and what it had in mind for us to do would rightly replace the study of evolution as the key to determining how we should live.

So what impact do these changes have on Objectivist philosophy? To examine this, let's follow Rand's reasoning briefly, this time with happiness as the ultimate value. Rand argues that "it is only an ultimate goal, an end in itself that makes the existence of values possible." (VOS, pp17-18) Values, in Rand's formulation, are "that which one acts to gain and/or keep" (VOS, p16) in pursuit of that ultimate goal. Thus, they now become those things which, objectively evaluated, further the organism's happiness, rather than its life.

(By "objectively evaluated", I mean that it is not arbitrary what makes people happy, that our potential for happiness was created in some particular way, and with some specific nature which is not a matter of our choice. Physical pain and pleasure mechanisms are the most easily perceived instance of this, but I would contend that the love parents naturally feel for their children is equally beyond one's choice. This is not to say that it is impossible for someone to not care about their children, only that it is as unnatural as enjoying physical pain.)

Morality Rand defines as "a code of values accepted by choice" (AS p932, OPAR p214), but it now starts not with the choice to live as she would contend, but with the choice to be happy. Virtue is still "the act by which one gains and/or keeps [a value]", (VOS, p27) and I see nothing to contradict her primary virtue of rationality and six derivative virtues of independence, integrity, honesty, justice, productiveness and pride. I like David Kelly's addition of benevolence to the Objectivist virtues as well. However, I've always liked the virtues of my Christian upbringing (what they call the fruits of the spirit) of love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control, too, and I hope to find that there is reason to give some of these better standing than they have without the notion of "genetic life" as a rational value for individuals.

Many of us find that we really DO care about others who are not likely to impact our survival, or even our flourishing - and now we can see that perhaps their life can be important to our happiness independent of its importance to our life simply because it is in the interest of the genetic life of which we are a part. Therefore the well-being of others could become anchored as an objective source of happiness for us. Note that I do not claim to have done that anchoring here, only offered the possibility of how it might be done in the future.

Sometimes in Objectivist reasoning, happiness is considered impossible except according to objective values and sometimes it is considered that our emotions (including happiness) are completely determined by what we value through reason (i.e. we are born tabula rasa - including our emotions). An example of the first take on happiness from Atlas Shrugged is: "Happiness is possible only to a rational man" (p939). An example of the second from OPAR is: "Emotions are automatic consequences of a mind's past conclusions" (p 161). The first implies that living according to irrational conclusions will make one unhappy, the second implies that living according to one's incorrect past conclusions could make one just as happy until they ultimately resulted in death. With "genetic life" defining and refining our nature, what results in our greatest happiness is ultimately beyond our control - but it turns out that a big part of what, according to our nature, makes us happy is living according to our rational convictions.

With this new formulation, there is no need to explain that when we say "life" we don't just mean survival, but we mean "flourishing", "life man qua man" or "life as a complete person". Happiness covers all of this. (Don't worry, we can keep the "man qua man" formulation if we really think it sounds cool. )

Now there is no need to explain the many things we do that are difficult indeed to tie to our survival. If they make us happy, that is explanation enough - although it may behoove us to examine the evolutionary origins and long-term consequences of these sources of happiness to be sure following them will not lead to diminished happiness in the future. Our eating habits are a prime example of this. In our evolutionary past there was no such thing as being "too fat" - there just wasn't enough food around. (Have you ever seen a truly rotund wild animal of any kind?) So we developed a natural tendency to stuff our face with as much fat, sugar, etc. as came within arms reach. But now, with food as cheap and easily available as it is, many of us find that our nature misleads us. We have to resist the temptation of that second or third luscious in order to preserve our health and our long term happiness.

The moral evaluation of suicide is handled rather well with happiness first. In Objectivist thinking, the choice to live precedes morality, but now it is the choice to be happy which precedes it. If you decide not to value happiness, then you truly have no way to judge what you should do in any situation - including suicide. If you decide that happiness is what matters to you, then you can evaluate any action, including suicide. The choice to end your life becomes rational and right if living an unhappy life is truly the only alternative. For example, you might find suicide the right thing to do if, after numerous happy decades of life, you find the only life you have left is semi-conscious and/or filled with pain and expensive care - eating up the money you had socked away for you grandchildren's education, say. More often, however, in the case of people considering suicide, there is still more happiness than unhappiness possible for them, and seeking help in finding that happiness is the right choice rather than suicide.

So what does all this buy you? What good does it do us to understand it? For me, the key realization is that if my life is not my highest value, there are things out there that I should value more than my own life. Think about that. There are values for you greater than your own life. Since values are those things which further the ultimate goal of happiness, that means there should be ways for you to be happier than you would be if you saved your own life (e.g. if you were cured of cancer). It also means there are things out there for which you would be truly and rationally happy to give your life.

If I were going to give people one clue as to how to achieve true happiness it would be this - "Find something you would die for, and live for that". If you can't see how that is possible, or doubt that it is, let me offer one suggestion: children. Have your own or borrow someone elses, raise them, teach them, and see if you don't come to love them more than you love your own life. All of our capacity for happiness was created through evolution, and the cornerstone of evolution is adults raising successful children. Based on that understanding of our nature, and on what I've heard parents say, I believe that children (and maybe not only our own) are a prime candidate to become a greater value for you than your own life. Of course, this may not apply for everyone, and there may be many other such values for you depending on your particular talents, opportunities, vision, etc. But to paraphrase Dr. Martin Luther King: "If you've never found anything you would die for, then you've never really lived".

Having philosophized for pages now, there is one thing I would like to acknowledge in closing. That is, that while philosophy may be able to determine that you should be seeking your own happiness, and science may be able to shed light on what is likely to make you happy; syllogistic reasoning is not your only tool in the pursuit of happiness. Developing a sensitivity to what in life is truly making you happy right now, learning what makes others happy and trying it for yourself, trusting what has made people happy for generations, acting on an inspiration before you know exactly why, etc. are all part of the process as well. No amount of thinking can replace all of what millennia of evolution have given us - but I believe it truly can put a proper foundation under what all the experimentation yields and cement it together into a unified whole. And ultimately, no matter how you get there, living a truly happy life is all that really matters.

Copyright (C) 1998  by Dave Wahlstedt -- slipstreaming status: off

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